The Impact of Diasporas

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OXFORD DIASPORAS PROGRAMME

THE IMPACT OF DIASPORAS ON THE MAKING OF BRITAIN:
EVIDENCE, MEMORIES, INVENTIONS
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THE IMPACT OF DIASPORAS:
FOREWORD
ROBIN COHEN AND JOANNA STORY

Academics are wilful creatures; they like to go their own way. In recent years, under the impact of national evaluation exercises designed to allocate diminishing research funds fairly, we have been pushed to produce safe articles straight from the High Citation Sausage Factory. The research councils, which once protected imaginative research so zealously, are constrained by having to demonstrate ‘value for money’, ‘relevance to UK economic interests’ and ‘impact’, often narrowly defined to mean of policy relevance to government and business. The Leverhulme Trust stands proudly apart from such utilitarian concerns, so is highly regarded, even loved, by academics. When the Trust announced its regular programme grant competition in 2010 on the themes of ‘The Impact of Diasporas’ and ‘Beauty’ coffee was spilled on the pages of the Times Higher Education Supplement by over-animated denizens of senior common rooms up and down the land.

In the event, the Trust decided that two complementary programmes on The Impact of Diasporas, from the universities of Oxford and Leicester, would be funded. From the beginning, at the celebratory reception in London, we decided to eschew the competition played out by universities as they claw themselves up the rankings ladder and declared our intent to work together whenever possible. As the Trust had recognised, the two programmes had considerable complementarities as well as differences. The Leicester project, in conjunction with the Institute for Name Studies at the University of Nottingham, has focused more on diasporas in the distant past, through early history, archaeology, genetics, and evidence from the UK; in Oxford researchers have worked mainly on international themes concerning the modern and contemporary world, and there most are social scientists. But there were significant overlaps too — as Oxford historians and geographers met cognate research in Leicester undertaken by psychologists and linguists, scholars in both locations found themselves working on popular discourses establishing boundaries between ethnic, national, diasporic and indigenous identities. Such is the nature of diaspora; it links dispersed groups and distils common goals.

There were a number of concrete results: we have collaborated on a joint special issue of a leading journal on the theme of ‘Markers of Identity’ (Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2015); we shared a mid-grant conference; a public lecture by an Oxford academic took place at Leicester. This publication is also a joint effort, providing a record of our research and a keepsake for our celebratory event at the Royal Geographical Society on 17 September 2015, marking the moment when our five-year grants are closing. Our projects stretch in time from pre-history and the middle ages to the present day. We meet (alphabetically) Anglo-Saxons, Celts, Euro-Senegalese, Hadramis, Kurds, Somalis, Vikings, and Zimbabweans, and some others besides. We find ourselves in places like Cape Verde, Cornwall, Denmark, Italy, London, Louisiana, Luton, Mauritius, Nairobi, Palestine, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the Wirral peninsula, Yorkshire, and Zambia. Throughout these projects, themes recur — not least the importance of a shared past in defining, sustaining, and reworking identities; when that shared past is linked to the concept of a homeland and travel (whether real or imagined, near or far, recent or long ago), we have the seeds of diaspora and the resonance of its impact.
on lives across time. These concepts were just as powerful in the past as they are in our present world, albeit glimpsed through cameras obscura rather than digital media.

The range of our colleagues’ work provides a wonderful cornucopia of themes, locations, concepts, and findings. For us, the most powerful form of impact is conceptual. And what better example than the concept of diaspora, which has travelled a long way from its origins in ancient Greece and its use in describing the fate and fortunes of forcibly displaced groups like Jews, Armenians, and Africans. As our contributors make clear, the concept has gained traction in many settings and for many groups (defined linguistically, genetically, ethnically, nationally, or in terms of their religious affiliation). The term has resonance, interpretive power (Weber’s *Verstehen*), and a capacity to cross continents and periods. It is suggestive without being precise; it allows sub-categorisation, typology, and comparison. We know too that concepts can exhaust their heuristic possibilities and become too vague to deploy, turning from lasers into loofahs. However, as our colleagues show in their projects and creative papers, there remain many immanent possibilities before the conceptual impact of diaspora diminishes.

The impact of diasporas also has many other aspects. The genetic and linguistic make-up of the British populations is conditioned by early diasporic populations; fragments of text – runic or genetic – preserve traces of travellers and their interaction with others. Identities are constructed in a complex dialogue between diasporic pasts and creolizing presents. Politically mobilised diasporas can be peace-makers or peace-wreckers in their countries of origin. Circles of trust and entrepreneurship can be built around diasporic loyalties. Religious convictions can cement diasporic identities or render them friable. Links with homelands can be strengthened or dissolved as diasporas organise. States can try to capture ‘their’ diasporas, while others will resist that embrace. Unemployed minorities can find solace in seeing themselves as diasporas. Stateless diasporas may have to exist without a legally-recognised homeland, or may seek to create one. The names we see in our country for people and places and surviving dialects are important reminders of our diasporic past. In all these ways we see ‘impact’.

The ‘impact of diaspora’ is also engrained in the face of the man who looks out from the cover of this book. In 2007, when this photograph was taken, the old man was a refugee from Afghanistan in the city of Peshawar, close to the northwest frontier of Pakistan. We know nothing of the actual circumstances of his life and can only guess at his motives for travelling away from his home; we do not know his fate. His face is timeless and he stands here for travellers past and present, for migrants throughout time, whether forced or willing. His direct gaze is a powerful reminder that the impact of diaspora is both physical and psychological. Diaspora is what people carry in their minds as well as on their backs, and it is this which sustains patterns of behaviour and links to homeland, to kin groups, to a shared past, and — for some — a common goal for the future.

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**CROSSING THE CONTINENT: AFRICAN DIASPORAS WITHIN AFRICA**

**OLIVER BAKEWELL**

**INTRODUCTION**

This project set out to examine how far the idea of diaspora can be applied to populations moving and settling within the African continent. The origins of the exploratory project lay in some simple observations. Over the last forty years, there has been a growing academic and popular interest in diasporas of African origin. In particular, during the last decade the interactions between these diasporas and their ‘homelands’ has come centre stage of many

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**FIGURE 1** Origins and Destinations in Africa (Map courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin)
discussions about development and change in the continent. Diaspora members have been identified as important sources of external funding, which is evident in the huge amounts of money that they send, making a vital contribution to the national economy of many African countries. Moreover, they may transfer new skills, practices and ideas that play a fundamental role in establishing new businesses or even generating political change. However, virtually all this interest in African diasporas has been focused on those who live outside the continent, despite the long history of movement across Africa and the fact that, even today, the vast majority of African migrants move to other African countries (Bakewell 2008).

This raised the basic question for this research project: do Africans who move to other parts of the continent also develop and sustain diasporic relationships? For example, do Nigerians who move to Zambia stay connected to a Nigerian community in the same ways as we see among the Nigerian population in London? Are they sending money and other support to family members at home? Are they making investments in Nigeria? And, what about their children — has their Nigerian identity reproduced through the generations? Or is the maintenance of their Nigerian heritage less prevalent compared to those who live outside Africa?

RESEARCH DESIGN AND STRATEGY
The project was designed and implemented by Oliver Bakewell (International Migration Institute at the University of Oxford) and Naluwembe Binaisa (formerly at IMI, now at the Max Planck Institute for Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen). Wilma Nchito (University of Zambia) also played a central role in the Lusaka fieldwork.

We decided to address these research questions through case studies of people settling in two African capital cities — Lusaka, Zambia and Kampala, Uganda — with contrasting social, cultural, economic, political and historical settings. In each city, we deliberately focused on populations who were from distant regions of Africa rather than those from neighbouring states. Our aim was to understand the situation of those who might clearly be identified as ‘strangers’. To enable comparison, we also sought those groups who might be found in both cities. These considerations led us to focus on Anglophone and Francophone West Africans (Nigerians and Malians) and Somalis, identified through preliminary field trips. In fieldwork during 2014, interviews were conducted with individuals from each group in both cities, along with key informant interviews with government officials, civil society organisations, and leaders of community associations. These interviews asked about the different approaches adopted by these groups to establish their place in the cities and the extent to which they seek to maintain their identification with their homeland and its people.

KEY FINDINGS
The analysis of data from the project is continuing so the findings are still emerging. However, it is possible to point to a number of contributions that the project has made to our understanding of diasporas within Africa.

First, at the most basic level, the research has drawn attention to some little known migrant populations within Africa’s cities who are navigating their everyday lives as strangers in a foreign land, with varying degrees of success, however that may be defined. This quiet process of settlement and establishing relationships across the continent has clearly been underway for some decades, at least since the 1970s in most of our cases. The difficulties and
challenges faced vary depending on the people’s origin and the society among which they settle. However, the critical point is that settlement is taking place and this challenges the narrative presented by research which focuses only on migrants in African cities when they are faced with violent exclusion and xenophobia, for example, as seen in South Africa.

Second, the comparison of these populations in two cities shows the importance of place in shaping diaspora formation. Somalis settling in Kampala were drawn into the well-established (Ugandan) Somali community institutions and mosques, strengthening their visible presence and benefiting from their acceptance. In Lusaka, the first Somalis only started arriving in the 1960s and the community was faced with carving out a niche in the life of the city from scratch. The experiences of Nigerians were also shaped by their histories of arrival and their reception by local residents. Many who came to Zambia arrived as highly skilled migrants invited by the Zambian Government in the 1980s and they joined the ranks of Lusaka’s middle classes. Nonetheless, the Zambians’ commonplace perception of Nigerians as crooks and shysters means that even professionals such as doctors and bankers are faced with exclusion and treated with great suspicion, creating a day-to-day, wearying discrimination that stops many from feeling at home. By contrast, in Kampala, many Nigerians came to the country to establish new enterprises and could gain respect from Ugandans as astute business people. Their exclusion is more self-imposed as they seek to preserve their culture and ensure their children do not adopt ‘unhealthy’ Ugandan values and practices. This shows that diasporas look rather different in different settings. It calls into question the value of generalised references to a diaspora, which are unqualified by the place in which its members are located. This is all too easily forgotten in some research into African diasporas in Europe and North America, where the driving force of diaspora formation is often ascribed to cultural considerations derived from the homeland rather than the conditions in which people settle.

The project also highlighted the importance of economic imperatives underpinning people’s diasporic relationships. In many cases, whether for business trips, access to capital or securing supplies from the homeland, connections have to be maintained. For example, Somalis in Lusaka, most of whom originate from one part of Somalia (Puntland), are strongly connected through clan networks that enable them to make business deals where trust is reinforced by social sanctions, as seen with Somalis in other parts of the world. As a result, they have established a strong business niche in the transport and construction industries in Zambia. In contrast, the Nigerians in Lusaka are more likely to be employed in jobs that are unrelated to any Nigerian connections, and it was members of this group who showed the most ambivalence about sustaining diasporic relationships.

Finally, while the structural conditions derived from the place and society in which people settle and their economic circumstances play a critical role in shaping diaspora formation, it is clear that the formation of diasporic identifications and relationships, and the strategies adopted to reproduce them through the generations are also a reflection of people’s agency. This was perhaps most visible among the Nigerians, where there was considerable variation in the range of people’s diasporic practices. It was also seen among some of the children of Malian men, most of whom had Zambian mothers, who came to challenge their fathers’ instruction in their Malian (mainly Soninke) culture as they got older. This challenges any assumption that people from the same homeland will come together and stay together as a diaspora in a foreign land. The question we have started to address in this research is when and how this might happen.

This project was exploratory in nature and necessarily limited in scope. Our respondents were primarily migrants in relatively secure positions in each city. Further research that includes those in more precarious positions and the second generation is likely to reveal a more complex mix of diasporic identifications and relationships. Our tentative findings need to be tested through new case studies in other African urban settings. By further exploration of these processes of diaspora formation in African case studies, it will be possible to see how far they mirror those observed among people of African origins living outside the continent, or whether perhaps they instead reflect a distinctive quality of African diasporas within Africa.

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CONVERGING CULTURES: THE HADRAMI DIASPORA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

IAIN WALKER

The Converging Cultures project set out to explore the dynamics of the Hadrami diaspora in East Africa and the Arabian peninsula. Hadramis constitute what is probably one of the oldest, most enduring and, at least until the contemporary period, most scattered of diasporas. Hadramawt, in contemporary Yemen, was and remains a harsh place. Although the region is agriculturally productive when it rains, it is frequently struck by drought and famine, consequently leaving its people with little choice other than to emigrate. For centuries Hadramis have walked, ridden, sailed, and, more recently, flown to a wide variety of destinations: the oases of the Nejd, the ports of the Malabar coast, the volcanic hills of Java and the thornbush scrub of Kenya. Much like the Jews, Hadramis are bound together by common religious practices: in particular the Shi’a school of Sunni Islam, but also a variety of Sufi practices (most notably — among religious leaders — the Alawiyya order, open only to sada, descendants of the Prophet). These latter provided a particularly strong mechanism for binding together different parts of the diaspora within the framework of a well-established hierarchical social structure, akin to the caste system, with the sada placed at the summit.

Although strongly religious in disposition, the Hadrami diaspora might also be characterised as a trading diaspora. The shrewd Hadrami shopkeeper is a fixture in the Indian Ocean world; many small businesses have subsequently grown into substantial concerns,
particularly in Saudi Arabia. Hadrami business acumen also benefited the homeland; remittances were returned, without which the homeland would have likely suffered, and so also did people. While the genealogical links that bound Hadramis to Hadramawt were strongest among the _sada_, many felt the pull and visited if they could. Women rarely travelled to East Africa or Southeast Asia since few Hadramis were willing to let their daughters go to such places, fraught with the dangers of foreign lands, mostly involving alcohol and loose morals. As a result, Hadrami men were often particularly anxious that their sons — born of and raised by local mothers — return to the homeland to be suitably acculturated, and many were indeed sent back. This constant movement of people between Hadramawt and places in the diaspora had the dual effect of bringing foreign influences into the homeland — food, dress, architecture, and even religious innovation — and also of ensuring that the diaspora remained Hadrami through a constant renewal from the source. Cultures converged in the homeland, renewing the cultures both of those in diaspora and of those who remained.

Fieldwork for the project was multi-sited, in East Africa (in the Comoro Islands, Tanzania and Kenya) and in the Arabian peninsula (Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Key themes included the links maintained and developed between people in different parts of the diaspora, and between them and the homeland, and the ways in which identities are constructed and expressed in different parts of the diaspora according to the different (or similar) social, political and historical contexts. Throughout the diaspora, Hadramis have maintained their identity as a community. In some cases, this identity is actively constructed, for example through the establishment of community groups such as the Al Yamin Society in Zanzibar, which has constructed its own building that is used both for the society’s own purposes, as well as being rented out for private functions. Funds raised by the society help to pay for medical and social assistance to the poor and to host cultural events. This not only creates a sense of community within the group, but also demonstrates a certain cohesion to outsiders.

Identities have been historically constructed. Under the British system of classification in the colonial era, Hadramis were classified as Arabs, rather than natives. This distinction was not forgotten in the post-colonial period, when Hadrami commitment to the nation-state was often questioned. The suggestion that Hadramis were not Africans led, in its most extreme instance, to the persecution, murder, or exile of Hadramis (and other ‘Arabs’) during the 1964 Zanzibar revolution. This also led to the issue of several thousand Hadramawt passports to anxious Kenyans of Hadrami origin in the mid-1960s. In the contemporary context of social and cultural expressions of identity differences between coastal (largely Islamic) and ‘upcountry’ (largely Christian) Kenya, Hadrami ancestry has sometimes been seized upon to deny Kenyan identity to individuals from the coastal regions. Identity discourses also work both ways, and in the Comoros the opposite is true. Comorians typically insist on the fact that they are Arabs, not Africans, and seize upon Hadrami genealogies as proof of this. The maintenance of links with the homeland are a natural expression of this identity, and people travel to and fro in order to visit kin, do business and to attend religious events.

Africans of Hadrami origin are identified as being different from other Africans through both their appearance (not simply ‘racial’ attributes, but also through clothing and comportment) and practice (being Muslim, speaking Swahili or Arabic, eating ‘foreign’ food), and thus they constitute a group that is rather easily identifiable, even if mistakes are made. This is different in the Arabian peninsula. In both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Hadramis resemble others in almost all respects; not only religion, but also language, physical appearance, and dress. Furthermore, since from a Hadrami perspective Saudi Arabia (for example) is not ‘abroad’, Hadrami women may travel there. This gives the Hadrami community in Saudi Arabia a very different profile from those in East Africa: Hadrami men did not need to marry culturally different local women, but brought their own wives with them from Hadramawt. As a result children, both boys and girls, were (and are) ‘fully’ Hadrami. At the same time, the similarities between the host cultures and Hadrami cultures are such that they are also locals. Indeed, there is little to differentiate, in absolute terms, between the different tribes of the Arabian Peninsula, whether they be Nejdi, Hijazi, Asiri, Khaliji or Hadrami. Only contemporary borders, which are in some cases barely a couple of decades old, divide them.

Although they are new, these borders do undoubtedly divide them. Formal inclusion in Saudi Arabia has become increasingly difficult over the years. Hadramis resident in the Kingdom in the early twentieth century could acquire citizenship with relatively little fuss, but since it made little difference to their status, many did not bother. By the time it did make a difference, it was too late, and the Hadrami community now finds itself divided into Saudi...
citizens and Yemeni citizens: the haves and the have-nots. Saudi citizens are entitled to all the advantages that citizenship confers; non-citizens, despite often being locally born, sometimes even of a Saudi mother, have very limited access to health care and education, are required to meet certain conditions before marrying a citizen (even a Hadrami cousin), and must have a Saudi sponsor as an employer in order to, at some cost, obtain and maintain residence papers. The conditions imposed upon Yemenis in Saudi Arabia are viewed by many Hadramis — who do not consider themselves to be Yemenis except in a strict legal sense — to be the result of the social, economic and political differences between Saudi Arabia and what was, before Yemeni unification in 1990, northern Yemen, the Yemen Arab Republic.

For those Hadramis who are denied Saudi citizenship, the logical solution to this problem is the next best thing: to reaffirm their Hadrami (as opposed to Yemeni) identity and to press for the independence of Hadramawt from Yemen, increasingly seen (not without cause) as a failed state. Hadramawt, it is argued, with its small, well-educated population, its oil resources and its fishing industry, its access to the sea and even (for some) a ruling sultan, would be welcomed into the fold of the Gulf Cooperation Council with the freedom of movement and access to resources for all that membership implies. Hadramis could then live in Saudi Arabia on an equal footing with other Saudis. Although this is largely fanciful — there is little likelihood of Hadrami independence in the foreseeable future — this political ambition has had the effect of fostering a increased sense of Hadrami identity within Saudi Arabia. While this is a specifically Saudi phenomenon, it has also had the consequence of increasing awareness of the Hadrami diaspora generally.

The Converging Cultures project has not extended to the Hadrami diaspora in South or Southeast Asia, where there are undoubtedly similarly interesting manifestations of Hadrami identity. Scholars working in these areas are producing excellent work. Results from the Western Indian Ocean suggest that there is a cohesiveness to the Hadrami diaspora that distinguishes it from other diasporas. People in different parts of the diaspora maintain links both with one another and with the homeland, and the exchanges between them indeed create converging cultures.

SEE ALSO:

CREOLISATION AND DIASPORA: DIVERGING, CONVERGING

ROBIN COHEN AND OLIVIA SHERINGHAM

In this project, we engaged with the concepts of diaspora and creolisation through a comparative study of four different settings. Diasporic and creolised identities tend to be conceptualised as ‘opposites’, the first placing emphasis on the past, the second on the present and future. This study explored the subtle ways in which the two concepts interact with each other. The key task was to elaborate and rework the contingent, historically specific, and situational settings in which diaspora or creolisation were salient and to analyse the ‘delicate dance’ between them.

CASE STUDIES
To select our four case studies, we looked particularly at those contexts where diaspora and creolisation emerge, converge, and diverge in significant and illustrative ways. The four sites chosen were:
- Mauritius
- Louisiana
- Martinique (French Antilles)
- Cape Verde

Within each site, we deployed secondary analysis of written material (including grey literature) in English, Portuguese, French and, where possible, a local creole language. This was augmented by fieldwork visits, interviews, participation in relevant events and a study of popular culture, including dance, carnival, music, heritage sites, art and artefacts. While
the research has been focused predominantly on historically creole societies, we have also explored how the concept of creolisation has developed in port cities, and in contemporary cities characterised by super-diversity.

The collective process of identity formation results in a number of possible outcomes and trajectories. For the purposes of understanding how new cultures emerge, we see people bringing to inter-group interactions some level of validation of their past identities (where they are from), just as they embrace some elements of other cultures they encounter (where they are at). Shared identities thus emerge as a combination of part-recovering, part-experienced and part-imagined possibilities, processes that are usefully conceptualised through the prisms of diaspora and creolisation. How these shared identities have emerged historically and experientially provided the basis for the research.

DIAPOSA AND CRELISATION IN MUSIC

We reviewed many social and cultural practices, including language use, preparation of food and religious observance. But perhaps the most enjoyable was researching carnival (now officially celebrated in sixty countries) and music-making. Most popular music in Europe and the USA can be traced to cross-overs and combinations between African and European elements. Music seems unusually prone to cross-fertilisation, perhaps because listening and the USA can be traced to cross-overs and combinations between African and European elements. Music seems unusually prone to cross-fertilisation, perhaps because listening and the USA can be traced to cross-overs and combinations between African and European elements. Music seems unusually prone to cross-fertilisation, perhaps because listening and experientially provided the basis for the research.

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Sometimes instruments make the journey too — the drums and banjos in Congo Square, New Orleans, and the cimboa (a bowed cordaphone) in Cape Verde have clear African origins. But something else happens too. New musical forms emerge from the plantation, from the encounter with other religions (often Catholicism) and other musical traditions, from emancipation, isolation, and the need to survive in difficult circumstances. The impress of history (the diasporic inheritance), the attempt to resist oppression from plantation owners and the state, and the influence of particular contexts (islands, swamps or a port city like New Orleans) all combined to generate an extraordinary cornucopia of popular music.

GENRAL REMARKS

We framed our investigation as a response to the question: ‘How do people of different cultural backgrounds who find themselves in a common space forge some kind of shared sensibility?’ We concede that there are other possibilities. They can wage endless war with each other: a Hobbesian nightmare of unyielding hatred, genocide, racism and xenophobia. They can ignore each other, living in parallel universes, sharing only the most minimal of interactions and the most restricted of common spaces. We openly express our starting point in saying that, instead of considering all possibilities, we want to focus on how people can interact with each other in more innovative and positive ways, and on how they can create new cultures while drawing on older identities.

Why do we not go further, asserting a normative preference that people should set aside all differences and embrace their common humanity? There are, of course, many practical difficulties in realising this cosmopolitan dream. But, as Stuart Hall has noted, there are also some more fundamental objections to simply eliding difference. ‘I am’, he said, ‘from the moment of birth, from the moment of entry into language and culture, dependent on that which is different from me. … Our common humanity, which is what you are speaking about, is the process of reciprocity with that which is not us, which is other than us, which is different’ (Hall 2007: 155).

How then do we imagine and construct that which is ‘us’ and that which is ‘not us’? This process happens both at a personal and at a social level. The collective process of identity formation results in a number of possible outcomes and trajectories. As diaspora and creolisation migrate as concepts and as practices, they provide a vital way of understanding social identity in a world on the move, intermittently switched on to global currents or retreating to reactive ethnicities, assertions of nationalism or religious certainties. Diaspora and creolisation, and their interaction, challenge the solidity of closed ethnic and racial
categories. In developing new cultural and social practices, a subtle form of power from below emerges and merges. A critique of established authority, a fount of original ideas, and an expression of bold inventiveness can be found in the evolution of creolised popular culture.

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DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN WAR-TORN SOCIETIES

NICHOLAS VAN HEAR

Mass refugee movements induced by conflict have contributed to the transformation of global society, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Substantial new diasporas have been consolidated from these movements. The new social formations appear to be enduring and have undertaken a variety of forms of transnational activity, shaping both the societies in which diaspora members find themselves and their home communities and societies.

While the role of diaspora-in-development has stimulated much debate over the last decade or so, it is only relatively recently that attention has turned to the influence of diasporas in war-torn societies. There has been a general shift in perception from ascribing to diasporas a negative influence in fomenting and supporting conflict (as ‘war mongers’ or ‘peace-wreckers’) to the more positive view that diasporas can assist with relief, peacebuilding, recovery and post-conflict reconstruction (as ‘peace-makers’ or ‘peace-builders’).

As this project shows, the reality lies between the two, and the balance of forms of engagement shifts over time and according to circumstances. This project explores the kind of community and society that may emerge from diaspora formation and engagement in conflict and post-conflict settings. It traces the emergence of diasporas that were formed as a result of flight from conflict, in terms of their socio-economic make-up, cohort/time of arrival, immigration status, and class, ethnic, generational, gender and other social cleavages, all of which shape the capacity of members of the diaspora for engagement.

Having established the contours of diaspora formation, the project tracks three spheres of diaspora engagement, ranging from the private to the public:

1. *The household and the extended family*: Engagement in this largely private sphere is the most sustained of the three spheres of diaspora engagement studied in this project. The most common and tangible form of engagement is sending money — remittances — and other resources in order to assist extended family members to survive, cope, or recover in conflict settings. Besides such transfers in cash and kind, diaspora members participate in life course events such as weddings and funerals, either ‘virtually’ or in person. Such engagement may involve visits and other physical encounters, but in conflict settings, online communication often replaces face-to-face physical connection.

2. *The known community*: This more public sphere of diaspora engagement incorporates collectivities of people that know or know of each other. This is the realm of associational life, involving home town, home village and old school associations, faith groups, welfare organisations, and other community-based and civil society organisations; some of these can help war-torn communities to recover by providing public goods. Such activities can help repair the social fabric shredded by years of conflict, not least by helping to re-establish social linkages ruptured during war and by re-building trust and confidence.
3. The ‘imagined community’: This largely public sphere includes ethnic, national and other collectivities to which one has an affinity without necessarily knowing their members personally. Engagement here includes involvement in and support for political parties and movements, insurgent or oppositional groups, participation in demonstrations and lobbying, and political, social or cultural debate in cyberspace. This sphere is usually the most volatile of the three spheres of diaspora engagement and the least pervasive in terms of sustained participation. Greater degrees of social mobilisation are required here than for the more routine activities of the other spheres.

There is, of course, interplay among these different spheres, so that — for example — what happens in the imagined community sphere may shape what is possible in the community and household spheres. There are also tensions among the different spheres — diaspora members may find themselves pulled between obligations to their own family in the host country, to their own community in the host country, to those in the wider diaspora, to those left in the conflict-ridden homeland, and to the wider political struggle in the homeland. Their capacity to meet these different calls varies according to their resources and social position, and may shift over time.

Empirically, the research has focused on Sri Lanka, the Somali regions, and Afghanistan. The analysis is structured around key post-conflict transitions in each of the cases:

a. Shifts in the forms of diaspora engagement after the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009
b. Diaspora engagement in the campaign to maintain remittance flows in 2013–14, against the backdrop of the re-establishment of government and a degree of stability in south-central Somalia from 2012
c. Diaspora engagement against the background of the Western military wind-down in Afghanistan from 2011

Conceptually, the research touches on the relationships between: structure and agency; force and choice in migration; the local and global; the translocal and the transnational; material life and identity politics. It draws on debates on livelihoods in conflict, on networks, social capital and class, on social transformation, and on how power shifts and travels through local and global dispensations.

The project draws principally on data gathered over the last fifteen years on the cases selected. It also involved supplementary data gathering among Sri Lankans, Somalis, and Afghans in various diaspora locations. Research methods have included interviews among extended families and communities in the diaspora to capture the range of forms and densities of linkages, as well as interpretation of statistical and other quantitative data. Diaspora communities have been profiled to establish and map their socio-economic conditions, experiences of conflict, linkages with home communities, and perceptions and engagement with home countries both in the past and present.

**Figure 2** Tamil Demonstration, 2009 (Nicholas Van Hear)

**Findings**

The three illustrative cases show:

a. the kind of social change that diaspora engagement sets in motion
b. the kind of society that emerges as a result of such engagement
c. the conditions under which diasporas constitute a conservative or a transformational force
d. the place of diasporas in the reconfiguration of the global political economy

The nature and possibilities for recovery and development in conflict settings are contested. For some, recovery in the aftermath of conflict is seen in terms of the restoration of what existed before; for others, it presents the opportunity for social and economic transformation. By providing ‘transnational social security’ — through remittances and assistance for communities, for example — diasporas may help to sustain communities in conflict settings. By investing resources and different kinds of capital, they may help to transform such communities economically and politically. Such transformations may be towards democracy and equity, or they may bolster division and sectional interests. Thus, there is a range of possible outcomes of diaspora engagement from sustaining to transforming societies and communities that have experienced war. Moreover, diaspora engagement is, of course, set in a broader context. The kinds of society that come about in the aftermath of conflict are subject to the differing visions and purposes of governments, international humanitarian and development agencies, international and national capital, and local communities whose interests sometimes converge and sometimes conflict with those of diasporas.

As noted at the outset, diasporans have variously been described as war-mongers, peace-builders, or ambivalent in their influence on conflict. This variety of characterisations might be explained by disaggregating forms of diaspora engagement, and the public and private spaces in which they occur, into three ‘spheres of engagement’ along the lines outlined above. Outcomes depend on the degree and nature of connection or disconnection between the diaspora and those who have been left or have stayed at home. The nature of this relationship varies and is often a matter of dispute. We offer a framework that takes account of different spheres of engagement, which may help to better understand the relationship between members of the diaspora and those back home in conflict settings.

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**See also:**

Brun, C. and Van Hear, N. 2012. Between the Local and the Diasporic: The Shifting Centre of Gravity in War-Torn Sri Lanka’s Transnational Politics, Contemporary South Asia, 20(1), 61–75


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EXPLAINING DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES

ALAN GAMLEN

Why do governments form institutions devoted to emigrants and their descendants in the diaspora? We tend to think of migration and migration policy in terms of immigration, but emigration and links to the far-off diaspora are also becoming increasingly important objects of policy concern. Formal executive and legislative government offices tasked with diaspora populations — diaspora institutions — have rapidly become a regular feature of political life in many parts of the world; only a handful existed in 1980, but over half of all United Nations Member States now have one (Figure 1), and many are fully-fledged government ministries.

Diaspora institutions are formal state offices dedicated to issues concerning emigrants and their descendants. They take a range of forms, as shown in Figure 1. Sometimes they are exclusive or shared cabinet ministries: examples include the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs or Serbia’s Ministry of Religion and Diaspora. More commonly, diaspora institutions are branch departments or directorates within the ambit of some broader executive branch ministry, as is the case with the Irish Abroad Unit within Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs. They may also take the form of inter-departmental committees tasked with diaspora policy issues. Diaspora institutions are also found in the legislative branch, as parliamentary standing committees, such as Nigeria’s House Committee on Diaspora Affairs; dedicated seats in the upper or lower house (such as in France or Italy respectively); or advisory councils created to comment on legislation affecting diaspora groups (e.g. the Portuguese Diaspora Council, chaired by the country’s President).

The rise of diaspora institutions is surprising, both theoretically and empirically. We would not expect such institutions to exist because they violate some of the basic assumptions about citizenship and sovereignty in the modern international system, extending these relationships beyond the territorial borders that are supposed to contain them. Indeed, until very recently, such institutions did not in fact exist except in a handful of states. Our research motivation is to find out why these conditions are suddenly changing. The growing literature on this topic is mainly in the form of single case studies, which effectively detail the dynamics in individual countries but are less effective at explaining the broader pattern of proliferation described above. The Diaspora Engagement Policies project aims to correct this imbalance through large-scale comparative research, using mixed research methods. Here we briefly explain this research design.

Two kinds of theoretical approach are commonly found in the existing literature on this topic. The first one focuses on the strategic behaviour of nation-states, arguing that they establish diaspora institutions in order to capture material resources from or through diaspora networks; they want remittances, investments, political influence, foreign intelligence and so on. The second approach focuses instead on the constitutive identities of states, arguing that they see the diaspora as a missing portion of the political community that is bound to the state by ties of mutual obligation. In contrast to both theories, we have put forward the hypothesis that neither national interests nor national identities explain the global rise of diaspora institutions. Instead, we need to focus on international dynamics, in particular, the role of international efforts to establish frameworks for inter-state cooperation in the area of migration.

In terms of research design, our first priority was to use comparative methods; comparison was necessary to move beyond theories that could explain isolated national experiences but were mute about broader international patterns. Based largely on single cases, previous studies tended to assume that the emergence of diaspora institutions and related policies of diaspora engagement were occurring independently of each other, in a few exceptional states. Though many of these studies alluded to a wider proliferation of diaspora engagement policies, they lacked the comparative data required to shed light on why this had been happening. However, the global spread of diaspora institutions depicted in Figure 1 suggests that the widespread assumption of independence may be flawed. With so many countries adopting similar institutions simultaneously, it seems likely that states may be influencing each other.

In order to probe this idea further, we defined and measured the existence and types of diaspora institutions across the entire United Nations system for the 34-year period from 1980 to 2014. We also collected numerical data on characteristics of states —economic, political, international and so on — related to our theoretical framework, and used longitudinal statistical techniques to scrutinise which kinds of countries were adopting diaspora institutions of which type. By attempting quantitative comparison on a scale not previously attempted, we aimed to challenge and build on existing theory in this area.

Longitudinal quantitative methods, including those that we used, are far better at revealing correlation than they are at demonstrating causation. In the natural sciences, explaining causation is generally a matter of making true statements about reality that correspond directly to what is observed. The assumptions underpinning this ‘positivist’ stance are that there is one true reality, and that which cannot be observed cannot be said to exist. This works well when the main aim is prediction, and the fact of a reliable association between two kinds of process is more important than any underlying mechanism that we might speculate is the cause of it.

However, the social sciences deal with human beings, who are less predictable. I can come up with a theory to predict your behaviour, but as soon as you know my theory, you can decide to surprise me. Why would you decide to do that? Well, I might have a theory about that too — but follow this track and soon the interaction between you and I takes on a subjective reality that is more important to both of us than any theory I might have once had about you. Rather than offering causal mechanisms to explain law-like relationships, we might instead choose to focus on the meaning of social life to the social actors who create social reality through these kinds of interactions. At the extreme, this ‘interpretivist’ stance holds that no truths are absolute, but all are relative.

One kind of compromise between these two extremes is to remain open to the potential existence of one true reality, while acknowledging that it can only be perceived through the clouded lens of the observers’ biases, which are a function of their social positions. From this ‘post-positivist’ perspective, explaining the rise of diaspora institutions is partly a matter of observation and partly a matter of interpretation. As well as observing large-scale patterns, we also recognised the need to speak directly and interact with the people who played the key roles in establishing diaspora institutions — to ask them what they did and why. For this reason, the project also involved observing, interviewing, and taking statements from senior politicians and civil servants in sixty different states with diaspora institutions.

The aim of the Diaspora Engagement Policies Project has been to explain the rise of diaspora institutions through large-scale comparative research using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. Diaspora institutions have existed as far back as the nineteenth century, but their recent rise is unprecedented. These institutions matter because they connect new developments in the global governance of migration, with new patterns of national and transnational sovereignty and citizenship, and new ways of constructing individual identity in relation to new collectivities. They have been overlooked partly because of their newness, but also partly because they operate in the grey zone between domestic politics and international relations — a zone that is growing more dynamic and significant in world politics.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**MULTINATIONAL FAMILIES, CREOLED PRACTICES AND NEW IDENTITIES: EURO-SENAGALESE CASES**

HELENE NEVEU KRINGELBACH

Transnational families involving spouses of different nationalities, linguistic, religious and cultural backgrounds, are one of the key characteristics of family formation in the contemporary world. Whereas in some cases, this is a recent outcome of the expansion of diasporas, in others, transnational marriage builds upon older migration patterns and colonial histories. In coastal Senegal, Euro-African marriage dates back to the early days of transatlantic trade in the seventeenth century, but with different class and gender inflections over time. This project, initiated in 2011, focused on the making of ‘relatedness’ in transnational families coming out of unions between a Senegalese and a European spouse.

Fieldwork was conducted over ten months, mainly in France but also in the UK and Senegal. The study also draws on insights into Senegalese family practices gained over several periods of fieldwork in Senegal since 2002, in connection with previous research on performance, morality and self-fashioning in urban Senegal. I have conducted interviews with fifty couples and former couples, and in some cases I have visited relatives in various locations. In addition, I have worked closely with a French civic association protecting the rights of bi-national couples (Les Amoureux au Ban Public).

The initial concern in this project was to explore processes of cultural creolisation and transmission in families with partners from different cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds, and this remains a central concern in my ongoing research. I have found that these processes are heavily shaped by the context in which people live, their financial resources, the legal status of the migrant spouse, and by the texture of the transnational ties they are able to maintain with family members back home and in diasporic communities. For couples with children living in France or the UK, for example, the ability to incorporate a Senegalese language and Islam into their children’s education is contingent on the ability to visit Senegal on a regular basis, and to receive visitors from Senegal or from the diaspora. This ability, in turn, is highly contingent on financial resources and legal status. The context also includes attitudes to religion in different societies. For example, the anti-Muslim sentiment that is increasingly palpable in France, as elsewhere in Europe, leads many French-Senegalese families to reassess the meaning of citizenship, and to worry about the future of their children.

During the course of fieldwork, it became obvious that immigration rules and the legal status of migrant spouses had a tremendous impact on the trajectories and welfare of the families. In France, this was particularly evident for those couples that were formed after 2003, when new immigration laws were passed (and again in 2006 and 2011). In the UK, many couples who applied for reunification after July 2012, when an income requirement was introduced for the sponsoring spouse, have been affected by prolonged, often dramatic periods of separations of spouses and their children. Immigration rules affect different categories of families in different ways: European women marrying African men, for example, are more likely to face bureaucratic hurdles in petitioning for their spouse’s residency than European men marrying African women, though most couples are affected to some degree.
In an important sense, the inadvertent promotion of transnational polygamy by European states also reinforces gender inequalities in Senegalese families. Whereas for Senegalese women, marriage to a European man excludes a marriage in Senegal, men may combine both, and thus live away from home while still fulfilling familial expectations. Senegalese migrant men, then, are increasingly caught up between two families among whom they must share their resources and emotional attachment. This very real concern for the welfare of multiple households puts tremendous strain on the migrants, which is intensified by European social climates that are increasingly hostile to Muslim men.

It may be said, however, that transnational polygamy is sometimes used strategically for migration purposes. But it would be too simplistic to criminalise those strategies. Firstly, these may be explained by the absence of alternatives for regular migration. Secondly, marriage aspirations and ideas of love, in Senegal as elsewhere, are almost always linked to hopes of social and geographical mobility. It does not make sense, therefore, to see genuine emotions and material benefits as being incompatible. In a Senegalese context in which polygamy has come to be associated with translocal migration, having a spouse and children in two places makes sense in moral terms. Senegalese migrant men, then, are increasingly caught up between three forces in tension with each other: the moral economy of kinship back home, ideas about love and nuclear family in their new households, and French/European states intent on controlling this type of migration by setting rigid standards for what constitutes appropriate forms of love, intimacy and family. In this confrontation, however, power lies squarely with states. Increasingly, sovereignty involves the simultaneous capacity to control human mobility within a given territory, and to impose specific family values and arrangements. In this new configuration, Senegalese aspirations to companionate marriage are smothered when one of the spouses migrates. Since migratory projects are seldom decided individually, many individuals are left to feel that marital life is sacrificed to broader imperatives of care for the extended family.

In an important sense, the inadvertent promotion of transnational polygamy by European states also reinforces gender inequalities in Senegalese families. Whereas for Senegalese women, marriage to a European man excludes a marriage in Senegal, men may combine both, and thus live away from home while still fulfilling familial expectations. Senegalese women ‘marrying out’ are often forced to make more decisive choices, which may be one of the reasons why such marriages are regarded with more ambivalence. This research also raises important questions on the messy, unexpected effects of restrictive immigration policies. Ultimately, one may ask what the consequences will be for social cohesion in European nations when significant numbers of migrants, themselves often future citizens, are pushed into practices like de facto polygamy, only to be stigmatised on the same grounds.

Finally, the contemporary context only goes so far in shedding light on diasporic family-making. Indeed, the historical roots of the Senegalese diaspora in France and the long history of marriage to Europeans on the Senegalese coast both play a crucial role in shaping attitudes to creolisation. Memories of ‘mixed’ marriage among earlier generations within Senegalese
families, for example, often shapes people’s attitudes to more recent unions. These memories may be positive, but more often than not they are associated with a fear that the children coming out of such unions will be ‘lost’ to the Senegalese family. The present, as always, resonates with echoes from the past.

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MARGINAL AND PRECARIOUS YOUTH: AUSTERITY, WORKLESSNESS AND POLITICAL RESISTANCE

LINDA MCDOWELL, ABBY HARDGROVE AND ESTHER ROOTHAM

Between 2012 and 2013, we have been working in Luton and Swindon with young men who have been disadvantaged by the changing nature of the UK labour market, including the increase in insecure and precarious employment since the financial crisis of 2007–8 and during the succeeding years of austerity policies. Over these years, the rise in unemployment amongst young people has been noticeable. Although overall rates of unemployment since the recession have been lower than expected, because workers were prepared to accept reduced hours and low pay in order to keep their jobs, young people, and especially young men from minority backgrounds, including recent diasporic youth and second and third generation youths, have been hit by a significant increase in joblessness. The number of people aged 16–24 from Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities who are long-term unemployed (without work for more than a year) has risen by almost 50% since 2010 when the Coalition Government came to power. However, unemployment among minority and low-skilled white youth (compared with an 8% rate overall) and young men were more likely to be unemployed than young women (23.4% compared with 18.4%). Both minority and low-skilled white youth also suffer from casual and precarious attachment to the labour market.

In this context, alienation and frustration among young people, especially minority men, has become a significant political issue, particularly after the urban unrest in English cities in August 2011. Young men without employment, with few educational qualifications and from minority communities were the majority of those arrested that year. Since then, specific anxieties about ‘radicalisation’ among young Muslims have replaced the general worry about unrest, in a context of growing xenophobia about migration into the UK.

The aim of our research was to bring together questions about the precarious labour market position of diasporic youth and their political engagement through interviews with young men who were jobless or in insecure work. We chose to work in two ‘ordinary’ British towns in the south of England, Luton and Swindon, which were relatively unmarked by urban unrest, but where manufacturing employment for men has declined significantly since the 1970s. We interviewed 80 young men in total, 44 in Luton and 36 in Swindon, including a small group of white British men for comparison. In both towns, the largest group of men interviewed were of South Asian heritage, from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, in the main, but not all, adherents of Islam. However, there were significant differences between them. In Luton, the men were members of long-established communities, with fathers or grandfathers who had migrated to the UK from the 1970s onwards, attracted by jobs in the then-expanding car industry. In Swindon, the most significant group of South Asian young men were Goan in origin, who had moved to the UK within the last ten years and with few existing contacts in the town.

For both groups, the history of migration was not straightforward. In Luton, early migrants had often moved from East Africa, not South Asia, disadvantaged by the Africanisation policies of newly independent states. In Swindon, the imperial heritage of Goa, a Portuguese colony until 1975, led to a different pattern, as the fathers of the men we interviewed moved variously to Angola, Macau, and Mozambique or to Portugal, endowing their sons with a European passport. Goans typically are Christians and have few links with other groups of South Asian backgrounds. We also interviewed small numbers of young men from a wide range of other backgrounds, reflecting the growing diversity of migration to the UK in the new millennium. Luton is one of the most diverse towns in the UK, second only to London in terms of its BAME population, approaching thirty per cent of the total. In Swindon, the BAME population is only five percent of the total (the national average is almost 13%), and has a shorter history of settlement.

Our questions concerned: job searching and employment; about the use of networks within diasporic communities to secure work; the ways in which low wage and insecure employment or worklessness affects young minority men’s sense of themselves as masculine; their ability to respond to community and familial demands about financial and other forms of support. We also explored the extent of political engagement among men whose sense of themselves as masculine might also be threatened by their precarious situation and by the racialised politics in their (new) home-towns. At present, the politics of race in Britain is characterised by a persistent rhetoric of the failure of multiculturalism and a new emphasis on cohesion and adherence to ‘British values’ and belonging. We found that the question of what is political or civil engagement in the UK between 2012 and 2014 was a complex one, influenced by interconnected and overlapping scales of belonging both to the locality and the UK, as well as membership in a dispersed diasporic community and, among some, loyalties to the politics of the localities within the countries from which they came, or where their parents or grandparents were born.
We spoke to most of these young men more than once, after initial interviews with all 80 in the Autumn of 2012. In a series of articles, we have explored the ways in which young minority men are constructed in the labour market as less suitable employees for the bottom end, while casual service sector employment was often all that was available to them (McDowell, 2014; McDowell, Rootham, and Hardgrove, 2014a). Despite the common media image of young men as aggressive ‘yobs’ or as work-shy idlers, we uncovered the serious efforts made by many interviewees to find work. For others, however, a realistic assessment of their prospects resulted in disengagement and acceptance of the unlikelihood of finding work which in turn would support them or enable them to achieve markers of adult masculinity, including independent living. Here familial support proved crucial in the maintenance of routine and respect while these men were jobless (Hardgrove, Rootham, and McDowell, 2015a and 2015b).

The findings about politics were also complex. On first examination, the young people we spoke to might be assumed to be disinterested in formal electoral politics (McDowell, Rootham, and Hardgrove, 2014b). In the words of an 18-year-old Bengali-British young man, ‘Politics are bullshit I think; it’s all crap!’ Frequently young people disparaged politicians, and suggested that all they could do was to react to policies put in place by those with power, without being in a position to shape them in any way. As a second Bengali-British youth in Luton explained: ‘whatever they do, they make their decisions and I just adapt my ways to it, just try to live with it.’ There was a strong sense that most young men struggling to find secure work focused their efforts on survival rather than political engagement. Among the Muslim community in Luton, for example, efforts were made by community leaders and the local police, as well as the young men themselves, to avoid confrontation when the EDL was in the town, although a minority among the interviewees actively engaged in protest. As an 18-year-old Bangladeshi-British youth explains: ‘Once they (EDL) came, first time they came very far and they got beat the crap out [of], they did. Police were too scared to stop us. We didn’t start it; they started it. We finished it’.

Precisely what community meant to them has been a key dimension to our research. While the young men we spoke to converge in their dissatisfaction with conventional politics and their deep sense of precariousness, they should not be described as politically apathetic. They are often opinionated on the important issues that affect their own and their communities’ lives, including the reasons for the difficulties in finding decent work. One clear finding is that while sometimes investing in a tough, independent, masculine identity, they are far from autonomous and self-determining. They are located within and attached to various communities, defined by both membership of a diaspora and by geographical place (Rootham, Hardgrove and McDowell, 2014). Webs of local relations, often characterised by interdependence, with their partners, families, friends, neighbours as well as, for some, wider transnational networks, are precisely what give meaning to what we might identify as their political engagements and activities.

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Eastleigh is a Nairobi estate that, over the last twenty or so years, has sprouted over forty shopping malls selling clothes, electronics and many other goods from the Gulf States and the manufacturing cities of Asia. This commercial transformation followed the migration into the estate of many thousands of Somalis from the late 1980s onwards. Through their settlement and leveraging of vast diasporic networks of sociality and trade, Eastleigh has become Nairobi’s ‘Little Mogadishu’.

A large proportion of the Somalis who came to Eastleigh/Nairobi in the early 1990s were refugees. With civil war in Somalia, a wave of people poured out of the country, most ending up in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. A significant minority, however, came to Eastleigh, bringing demographic and economic change. As the real Mogadishu collapsed into conflict, Nairobi’s ‘Little Mogadishu’ became what it is today: a commercial hub drawing in not only refugees, but also shoppers from as far afield as Tanzania and Central Africa, and also investors from the UK, USA, and elsewhere. Eastleigh’s landscape has been well and truly transformed in the process. Alongside its malls, multi-storey apartment blocks and hotels have also sprouted, overwhelming a landscape once dominated by simple single-storey buildings. Thousands now work in this estate, and many more have started businesses elsewhere in Kenya supplied by the networks that run through it. In the face of this private development, Eastleigh’s public infrastructure has struggled to cope; until recently its main thoroughfares often became muddy rivers. As one Somali living in the estate told me: ‘Look up it’s Dubai; look down it’s dirt.’

My project within the Oxford Diasporas Program — ‘Diaspora, Trade and Trust: Eastleigh, Nairobi’s Little Mogadishu’ — sought to understand the social underpinnings of the trade networks running through Eastleigh, and also the key role that the Somali diaspora has played in its transformation through remittances and direct investment. It also aimed to understand how other communities have engaged with and been affected by its commerce, in particular the many Ethiopians (especially Oromo) also resident in the estate, and the Meru, a Kenyan ethnic group with a strong population in Eastleigh where they have settled in order to trade khat, a popularly consumed stimulant. I began ethnographic fieldwork in the estate in July 2011, and over the next few years, would spend many months in Eastleigh researching the estate’s economy and the people who animate it.

Eastleigh proved just as fascinating a locale to research as anticipated. Somalis are now spread throughout the globe, and have a vast reach in terms of trade, with contacts in Dubai, Bangkok and Hong Kong and elsewhere constantly feeding the estate’s malls with products along a Somali global infrastructure of money-remitters and freight companies. Remittances sent to the estate from the diaspora are crucial to its stories, with much money sent to help families in the estate survive, and even to establish businesses. Also, people from the diaspora do not merely send money to the estate, but many come there to live and work. Its restaurants and hotels are alive with the accents of Somalis of Danish, British, Canadian and American citizenship, who see more opportunity in Kenya than in their countries of citizenship. One
Somali who had left a business in London to invest in Nairobi urged me to give up British academia and start a business in East Africa with the words: ‘Listen mate, England is finished’.

Of particular interest for the project was how trade relations — almost always unsupported by legally-binding contracts — are maintained by businesspeople in the estate. In this regard, the concept of ‘trust’ plays a key role in Eastleigh, providing a normative idiom for describing both how trade is done, and how trade should be done. Somalis are keen to emphasise how they trust each other, to the degree that millions of shillings might be exchanged on the strength of a handshake. In all this, Islam is key, offering a foundation for trust, and also encouraging trust to extend beyond the bounds of clan. Many Somalis in the estate and elsewhere argue that Islam is the critical factor in how Somalis have survived in the last twenty years through the networks of support it provides, helping them endure the tragic conflict that has beset their homeland. The institution of the shopping mall is also critical for the Eastleigh story and its personalised trade, as these places crammed full of hundreds of little shops rely on strong bonds of sociality between those working there.

Furthermore, the research project has highlighted that while it is a story of Somali displacement and diaspora, Eastleigh is also very much a Kenyan story. Its history is one that links to much wider patterns of settlement in urban Kenya, while much of the key capital that helped generate and sustain the boom is, in fact, Kenyan. Its early capitalisation owes much to the export of Kenyan khat, while a very Kenyan ‘institution’ helped channel much of the diaspora remittances into the physical form of the shopping mall: goodwill. A variant of the standard business practice of charging money for the intangible assets of a going concern — ‘goodwill’ — in Kenya has come to be used as a sum paid on top of rent and deposit to reserve the right to trade in a shop. Goodwill for a small Eastleigh shop can fetch anywhere between $5000–20,000, even more for a bigger shop, and such has been the demand that many have been willing to pay these sums. As a result, some shopping malls have been capitalised by merely putting up a sign saying ‘coming soon’ with a phone number for people to ring and reserve their shop. In this way, a shopping mall project can raise hundreds of thousands of dollars even before the foundations have been laid. Another key Kenyan factor is the demand for the goods sold in the estate. Kenyan and wider East African demand for these products — sold more cheaply than their equivalents in Nairobi city centre — has also been a critical factor in spurring Eastleigh’s commerce.

However, another Kenyan aspect of the story is that of Kenya’s relationship both to Somalia and to the Somalis living within its borders. There is a long history of the marginalisation of Somalis in Kenya’s arid northeast, with a number of cases of atrocities perpetrated by the police and military in the region in the name of ‘security’, especially in the years following a secessionist campaign by some in the north for the region to become part of Somalia. Such historical grievances have never been truly resolved and, sadly, the situation grows ever more tense. Kenya sent its armed forces into Somalia in 2011 in order to try and secure its border regions. This has prompted many counter-attacks within Kenya by the Al Shabaab militant group that the armed forces hoped to rout. These include grenade attacks on Eastleigh itself, including one that seriously injured the local MP, himself a Kenyan Somali. In the wake of another attack — that on the Westgate, a very different type of mall on the other side of the city — the government launched an operation to round up refugees and ‘illegal aliens’ in the estate, despite most refugees having very little sympathy for the perpetrators of the attacks. This links to a much longer history of screenings and round-ups of Somalis, whose identity has long been suspicious to the Kenyan state. However, state interaction with Eastleigh is not always hostile. There are politicians who praise the worth of Eastleigh to the Kenyan economy, and recently the authorities have finally renovated its roads, and even incorporated it into plans for Vision 2030 (Kenya’s developmental blueprint) as a key business hub.

I am currently finishing a book on this estate called *Little Mogadishu: Eastleigh, Nairobi’s Global Somali Hub* to be published by Hurst Publishers. This book brings out the many dimensions of the Eastleigh story. These include the local, national, regional and global processes that have made it what it is, and also includes the temporal dimension: the history of the estate and of Somalis within Kenya, a history that still weighs heavily on this remarkable example of the dynamism of urban Africa and the power of the Somali diaspora.
THE ANIMATORS: HOW DIASPORAS MOBILISE TO CONTEST AUTHORITARIAN STATES

ALEXANDER BETTS AND WILL JONES

Our work aims to provide an in-depth and granular analysis of contemporary transnational politics. In order to do this, we examine how diasporas form in order to contest authoritarian states in Africa. How do they emerge and adapt? What determines the agendas they adopt and the institutional forms they assume? Under what conditions do they succeed in having an impact on the politics of the homeland? We focus on two African examples: Zimbabwe and Rwanda, both of which are authoritarian states which also have two of the putatively most active contemporary African diasporas.

Based on extensive multi-sited fieldwork carried out over two years in South Africa, Botswana, Uganda, the UK, Belgium, and France, our project traces the recent historical evolution of these transnational communities. It shows how, far from being static or permanent, diasporas are inherently political entities that have dynamic “lifecycles”. Their existence and the forms they take are historically and politically contingent. Crucially, we argue, these lifecycles, and the durability of the diaspora, are determined not by the inherent qualities of the diaspora but by the role of elite “animators”, who make resources available to the diaspora.

Overall, the project takes up the challenge proposed by other scholars of diaspora, and recognises that diasporas are dynamic rather than static, and that they are frequently mobilised by external actors (‘animators’) for particular political ends. On an empirical level, we contribute two untold and important transnational political histories: of the Rwandan (2003–13) and Zimbabwean (2001–13) diasporas. On a theoretical level, the project offers insights into how political science and international relations can better conceptualise transnational politics in the early twenty-first century.

Our work begins with an empirical puzzle, which existing theories struggle to address. Diasporas are born at particular moments, they may decline, dissipate, and die. And they may also exhibit afterlives, maintaining the external façade of existence even after their meaningful activities have long since ended. While this is by no means the case for all diasporas, some appear to have less durability and greater cyclicality than others. This observation leads us to a particular research question: how can we explain diaspora formation? In other words, what determines whether particular communities come to regard themselves and behave as diasporas in the first place? What determines the institutional form they take? What determines their agendas? What explains their relative durability over time or, alternatively, their decline and disappearance?

We examine this political process in the particular context of diasporas formed to contest competitive authoritarian states in Africa, because this is a context in which most of the relevant politics takes place outside boundaries of the state. By definition, opportunities for political contestation within the territory of the state are greatly restricted and so often take place transnationally. In Rwanda, Faustin Twagiramungu was defeated in the Rwandan elections in 2003, at the end of the “transition period” that had been put in place after the 1994 genocide; after this the main context of political contestation became transnational.

Similarly in Zimbabwe, 2001 was a moment when the most viable avenues for political contestation became transnational.

In both the case studies, we engaged in an in-depth process tracing the lifecycle of the two diasporas (our dependent variable) and we examined how the characteristics of the external ‘animators’ (our independent variable) have influenced those trajectories. We have structured both cases studies in a similar way in order to allow them to be read both independently and comparatively. For both Zimbabwe and Rwanda we explore:

1. the birth of the diaspora
2. the death and political afterlife of the diaspora
3. the often neglected humanitarian role of the diaspora that endures even after avenues for meaningful political activity may have closed.

In the case of Zimbabwe, we have argued that much of what we think of as the political organisations of the ‘Zimbabwean diaspora’ were a by-product of attempts by non-Zimbabweans to contest the Zimbabwean state until the 2008 elections. In particular, we argue that a loose network of South Africa-based elites, keen to influence South Africa’s bilateral policy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, mobilised donor resources to animate the diaspora. In other words, the diaspora was effectively an instrument with which a small group contested ZANU-PF rule in Zimbabwe. However, once the structures of the Government of National Unity emerged in Zimbabwe in 2009, and the main site of Zimbabwean politics moved back to Harare, these external animators discarded the associations they had previously funded, and diaspora organisations were left to struggle onwards, denuded of the wider international structure of material resources that had made them initially meaningful. These residual structures have fallen into two categories: a group of sidelined political aspirants, eager to

Members of the Zimbabwean Movement for Democratic Change in Pretoria, South Africa, during a visit of the MDC Youth League (Church Square, Pretoria), with one of the authors (W. Jones)
attract further funding to retain status, and a small number of humanitarians, continuing to do practically important, but politically marginal, work with exceptionally limited resources.

In the case of Rwanda, almost the opposite is true. The political organisations of the ‘Rwandan diaspora’ (as opposed to the political organisation of other Rwandan extra-territorials) are confessions of the RPF state apparatus, and are designed to fulfill certain important ends of the state overseas. Among the most important of these RPF objectives are: contestation with Rwandan territorial nationals unwilling to accommodate themselves to the present dispensation in Rwanda; the occlusion of that very contestation; the discursive presentation of an anti-political diaspora, and further activities aimed at securing Rwanda’s international reputation more broadly. Although between 1994 and 2001, opposition (mainly Hutu) took place, it was fragmented, incoherent, and institutionless, and was consequently violently smashed by the Kagame regime. Then, from around 2007, Rwanda began to play the ‘diASPoric game’ itself, resuscitating a pro-regime diaspora. Against this backdrop, there has been a revival of transnational resistance since 2009. This has been based around two elements: elite political parties and a separate campaign of resistance related to refugee rights. Both have been largely unsuccessful. Where the former is constrained by its inability to attract external animators, the latter has been co-opted by a different transnational network of external elites.

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(RE)CONCEPTUALISING ‘STATELESS DIASPORAS’ IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

ELENA FIDDIAN-QASMIYEH

Diasporas can be categorised as groups of individuals who have come to define themselves through reference to a common identity and attachment to an existing or desired homeland. In the context of ‘stateless diasporas’, it is frequently assumed that this homeland has either not yet been physically achieved or has yet to be internationally recognised, and that individuals hold no effective citizenship in their context of origin. Indeed, statelessness — a condition held by people who have no nationality and therefore are not protected by a state — has been ‘rediscovered’ by academics, policy-makers and practitioners since the 2000s. Since then, academic research, advocacy campaigns and policy reports have all highlighted that stateless people are vulnerable to marginalisation and a wide range of human rights abuses, and that there is an urgent need to ‘solve’ situations of statelessness. In particular, the United Nations, NGOs and government ministries hold that the main ‘solution’ is for stateless people to secure a nationality and state protection either from their country of origin or from another country where they now live. To achieve this, and to prevent future cases of statelessness, states should become signatories to the relevant international conventions, implement appropriate reforms to their nationality laws and/or apply their existing laws without discrimination, and establish statelessness determination procedures if they do not yet exist in order to identify stateless people.

However, in spite of this boom of ‘expert’ literature and the development of policies to identify and resolve situations of statelessness, little is known about how individuals and groups, who are defined as ‘stateless people’ by ‘experts’, understand such labels and policy categories themselves. To fill this gap, between 2011 and 2013, the comparative research project (Re)Conceptualising Stateless Diasporas in the European Union, has conducted over one hundred individual interviews and ten household interviews with Kurds, Palestinians, and Roma who hold a wide range of legal statuses in France, Italy, Sweden, and the UK, in order to examine how they construct, negotiate and/or reject both statelessness and diasporic identity in the EU.

Our interviewees included de jure stateless people but also asylum-seekers, undocumented migrants, and naturalised EU citizens. This variety of statuses corresponds to the different migration, asylum, and statelessness regimes that exist across the EU. For instance, Italy and France have well-established (if complex) statelessness determination procedures, while the UK’s statelessness determination procedure only became effective in April 2013, and Sweden has historically expedited the granting of citizenship to refugees and stateless persons, including Kurds and Palestinians. By conducting research in these four European countries, we have aimed to better understand the ways in which different migration and citizenship regimes across the EU, as well as broader philosophies of integration and belonging in these countries, influence individual and collective approaches to statelessness amongst Kurds, Palestinians and Roma. This has been particularly important at a time when new policies — including new statelessness determination procedures — are being introduced to ‘solve’ statelessness worldwide.

Overall, the project has critically explored how individual and collective experiences complement, and at times challenge, the official discourses and policies developed by policy-makers and academics. Transcending the legal focus of much research regarding statelessness, this has also entailed exploring key questions pertaining to the diasporic nature of certain stateless groups, examining whether, and how, individuals of Kurdish, Palestinian and Roma backgrounds develop and maintain connections with other members of their communities across time and space, and socio-political commitments to their respective homelands.

One notable finding from our work is that, although the study of statelessness is a relatively specialised academic area and is not widely debated in the European public sphere, Kurdish and Palestinian interviewees were acutely aware of the situation of dozens of stateless groups around the world. Although none of the Roma interviewees in Italy knew the Italian term for stateless (apolide) and rarely referred to other stateless groups, our Kurdish and Palestinian participants jointly identified over twenty five groups which they considered to be stateless either because they held no effective citizenship anywhere in the world, or had no independent state of their own. Of particular interest, given the comparative dimension of this project, is that the Roma were also regularly positioned as a metaphor of statelessness, with Kurdish and Palestinian interviewees often expressing identification and solidarity with the Roma as a persecuted stateless group within the European Union.
In contrast with this notion of solidarity, however, other interviewees presented a ‘hierarchy’ of statelessness. For instance, the Roma and Assyrians were labeled as ‘really stateless’, while other groups’ claims to statelessness were questioned. This was particularly significant since many Kurdish interviewees identified a political privilege that comes with being defined as stateless by others, and viewed this label as granting international legitimacy to claim the right to have a state. Many Kurds identified Palestinians as being at the forefront of the queue of stateless people to gain statehood, while they felt that they were denied the same right because they are categorized as Iraqis, Iranians, Turkish, and Syrian regardless of their self-categorization and self-identification.

The project has also highlighted the need to move beyond legal definitions of statelessness, since it may simultaneously be conceptualized as a legal, a socio-political, and as an existential condition. Understandably, legal definitions of statelessness centralize the absence of effective nationality and state protection, with de jure stateless groups such as the Roma being widely recognized as being vulnerable to discrimination and marginalization across Europe. Interviews were conducted with ten Roma households in Naples, Rome, and Pisa whose families included at least one member who either held official stateless status, was pending a legal decision or who has had their application for stateless status refused by the Italian authorities. These interviews revealed how the precariousness of their legal status affects Roma families across generations, and how it impacts on intimate aspects of family life, including marriage strategies and childbearing. A 1991 Italian nationality law grants children born in Italy to stateless parents the right to automatically acquire Italian citizenship; however, in order for the child to be eligible, the parents must have obtained formal recognition of their stateless status before the child’s birth. Because of several hurdles that impinge on the procedures for status recognition, automatic access to citizenship through this legal route is extremely limited in practice. As such, stateless Roma parents struggle to register their children’s births in Italy and are therefore more vulnerable to them being taken by social services. Simultaneously, relationships break down because of the protracted uncertainty caused by statelessness or lack of documentation, and so life chances for children and young people are severely limited. Ultimately, decisions over settlement and mobility also reflect the insecurity of their legal status. Family networks scattered across Italy and Europe provide an important support mechanism and source of knowledge on how to cope with this protracted condition of statelessness.

In spite of an established statelessness determination procedure in Italy, this project has revealed the objective difficulty Roma people face in being granted stateless status; the administrative process is expensive, laborious, and unclear. This ingrained legal insecurity has led to the ongoing dispersal of Roma individuals and families across the EU, reconstituting the Roma as a ‘stateless diaspora’ even when the sense of belonging to the Roma community is not necessarily related to the idea of belonging to a homeland or to aspirations for a state.

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**Figure 1** A UK-based Palestinian meets his mother for the first time in seven years, during her first visit to Europe from Baddawi refugee camp in North Lebanon. Sweden, 2010 (Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh)

**Figure 2** Sufi Zikr in a Roma encampment, Italy 2014 (Nando Sigona)
In contrast, many of our interviewees presented the Palestinian and Kurdish homelands as being just as important to their understanding of statelessness (and at times even more important) as the absence of a nationality and state protection. Importantly, many of our Palestinian and Kurdish interviewees considered themselves to ‘be’ stateless even though they held one or more European or Middle Eastern nationalities and were therefore not classified as ‘stateless people’ in the EU. Challenging policy-makers’ assumptions that being granted ‘a nationality’ is the official solution to statelessness, many interviewees argued that statelessness will only be resolved when a specific state (Palestine/Kurdistan) grants a specific (Palestinian/Kurdish) nationality. This demonstrates that although ‘nationality matters’ in solving statelessness (Van Waas, 2008), in cases such as the Kurdish and Palestinian contexts, so too does the right to national self-determination.

A further element emerging in this research is that while many stateless people struggle to be granted official stateless status, some members of ‘paradigmatic’ stateless diasporas may themselves reject this label and legal status. In particular, a number of Palestinian interviewees in France and the UK resisted the ‘stateless’ label since that they considered that the terminology of statelessness was being imposed on them in the EU (where they had first encountered the label) and was ‘aggressive’ in nature. Revealing a potential disconnection between different understandings of statelessness, the right to be recognised as having originated from Palestine — rather than being denied such an origin through the category ‘state(less)’ or the identity code ‘XXA’ — emerged as an essential, even existential, matter; the denomination of statelessness was considered a form of epistemic violence. In this context, the development of administrative procedures and policies that attempt to resolve the issue of statelessness, through recognition of an individual’s legal status and subsequent granting of citizenship, was seen by many interviewees as erasing the broader political cause of a collective struggle by weakening the connection to the homeland. Importantly, ambivalence towards or resistance to the stateless label is not a rejection of individual claims to rights and protection, but rather a rejection of a series of processes which re-inscribe, rather than redress, the absence of a demarcated geographical compass: Palestine. Ultimately, for many interviewees, the label ‘stateless’ was not perceived as offering protection; instead it had the potential to erase existing identity markers and forms of attachment, and even to negate the right to self-determination itself (as a collective right which would provide both collective and individual remedy to disenfranchisement and erasure).

Another key conclusion emerging from this research has been that Palestinians and Kurds are not only attached to their ‘homeland’ (which has been the traditional focus of diaspora studies), but also to other spaces across the Middle East. For instance, the ongoing Syrian conflict has highlighted the emotional commitments that many Palestinians in Europe feel towards Palestinian refugee camps when they are under attack (as has most clearly been the case during the siege of the Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus), but also towards ‘hosting’ countries such as Syria itself. These spaces of transnational mobilisation and emotional attachment include places to which Palestinians and Kurds may have no direct physical or family connections but which have become emblematic of their hardship and/or struggle for self-determination.

In turn, the violent spread of ISIS across the Middle East has united Kurds by creating transnational solidarity and diverse modes of transnational mobilisation among the Kurds in diaspora and in the Middle East. And yet it has simultaneously rendered visible their differences, revealing the fragmentation of Kurdish identity, reinforcing distinctions among Yezidi Kurds and Muslim Kurds, and among the diverse Kurdish parties that have alliances with different regional actors that often stand against each other in the Middle East.

In the context of new and overlapping processes of displacement and dispossession in and from the Middle East, and of ever-shifting migration and citizenship policies and practices across Europe, we will continue to comparatively explore the meanings of statelessness for members of these and other ‘stateless diasporas’ within the EU and Middle East alike.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project was generously supported by the Leverhulme Trust, and included two closely related research components: (Re)Conceptualising ‘stateless diaspora’: intersections between individual and collective statelessness amongst Palestinians and Kurds in Sweden, France and the UK (led by Dr Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh), and Migration regimes, models of citizenship and experiences of statelessness amongst Roma in Italy (led by Dr Nando Sigona). Dr Barzoo Eliassi was a Research Officer working in particular on the Kurdish case-study. Parts of this article draw on summaries by Sigona (Roma) and Eliassi (Kurds). Dr Nell Gabiam and Dr Latif Tas were Research Consultants on the Palestinian and Kurdish components respectively. Antonio Ardolino, Ayta Bonfiglio, Sergio Bontempelli, Alice Cirucci, Caterina Guisa, Dastan Salehi, Francesca Saudino, Stacey Topouzova and Paladia Ziss offered invaluable research assistance in the UK and Italy.

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FIGURE 3 The Dalkurd football team in Borlänge, Sweden shows support for Kurds in Kobane, Syria, 2014 (Dalkurd FF Supporters’ Facebook page)
RELIGIOUS FAITH, SPACE AND DIASPORIC COMMUNITIES IN EAST LONDON

NAZNEEN AHMED, JANE GARNETT, BEN GIDLEY, ALANA HARRIS AND MICHAEL KEITH

Diaspora is inherently both a temporal and spatial concept; it speaks of an unfolding process of dispersal that occurs over time. And yet much of the scholarly and policy use of the concept has been curiously aspatial and atemporal. Within conventional migration studies or in the discourses of the states and development agencies that seek to ‘engage’ with diasporas to grow economies, both space and time are seen as blank, neutral canvases on which social processes are inscribed. Such social scientific accounts and policy documents have been targets of exclusion: white nativists launched ‘anti-alien’ campaigns against Jews in the Victorian period but reinvented anew in every decade of our study). We also found Jewish socialist refugees from Nazism whose commitment to an explicitly diasporic politics meant they refused to leave the East End for either Zion or the suburbs.

Mental Maps

The East End of London has been romanticised, exoticised, mythologised and commodified as a site of migration and poverty. These narratives have been used to frame the understanding of the UK’s migration story. The East End is characterised variously as slum-territory, as a site of foreign contagion in the national body politic, or as the repository of warm, bonded community; each narrative has attracted religious mission, whether to tame and civilise the diasporic other within, or to anchor an authentic community lost to modernity’s secular drift. In our research, however, we identified alternative maps of the area, showing how East London’s people have lived both by and around the conventional narratives, developing their own diasporic imaginaries.

Arrivals and Departures

Our project considered migration as a process, and explored the roles that religion played in framing and mediating this process. Conventional narratives frame the East End as the point of arrival of ‘waves’ of migrants from elsewhere, who then integrate by moving up and out to leave room for the succeeding wave. We found alternative cartographies of arrival and departure: faith-based associationalism providing both ways in which diasporic subjects maintained intense connections with multiple homes and homelands elsewhere, and also ways in which they re-rooted and made new homes in the East End, sometimes sharing them with East Enders of other faiths. We were particularly interested in those whose arrivals or departures placed them out of sequence in the conventional narrative: coming late, staying behind, refusing to move on, re-investing the capital they accumulated in the city instead of suburbanising, or returning from the suburbs for devotional or profane reasons. We found non-migrant ‘natives’ who ‘settled’ among the migrants (for example in the Christian settlement houses established in the Victorian period but reinvented anew in every decade of our study). We also found Jewish socialist refugees from Nazism whose commitment to an explicitly diasporic politics meant they refused to leave the East End for either Zion or the suburbs.

Strangeness

In their intrinsic mobility, cities embrace strangeness. Discourses of strangeness, the alien, and the foreign abound in narratives of the East End, constructing the space as London’s Other, the heart of darkness at the centre of the global city. Strangers have been the objects of cosmopolitan affinity or religious philanthropy; Christian missionaries established ‘Strangers’ Homes’ for Muslim seafarers by the East End docks, for example. But strangers have been targets of exclusion: white nativists launched ‘anti-alien’ campaigns against Jews in the 1900s, and formed leagues to ‘defend’ England from Muslims in the 2000s. But our research showed how diasporic populations resisted or played with these categories, and developed languages that emphasised instead solidarity, community, commonality, fraternity, often grounded in faith-based practices and institutions, reframing and deploying gendered and classed terms that have not always been inclusive. These have provided an infrastructure for resisting racism — as with faith-based and interfaith activists in the anti-racist movement — or simply for making a new life in the receiving context, for maintaining living connections with real and fictive kin transnationally. The Methodist Home Mission in Bow, for example, provided social services to a community that over time has included irreligious slum-dwellers, German Lutheran seamen, and Bangladeshi Muslim mothers.
Sacred Space

Devotional practice, and the micro-cartography of devotional spaces inscribed in the cityscape of the East End, have been central to the migrant experience. Different religions have had different understandings of sacred space, and so have developed different spatial forms for devotion in the arrival city. But these understandings and forms have mutated through the process of mobility and adapted to the specificities of London, creating patterns across faith groups. The devotional infrastructure of earlier migrants — in domestic space, in repurposed profane sites, and in purpose-built places of worship — have been reappropriated and reconfigured by new arrivals as they root down in the East End. Sometimes different groups have contested the use of space; other spaces have been shared across denominational lines, as with the Fieldgate Street Synagogue nestled in the periphery of the larger East London mosque. Early Muslim clerics bought meat from kosher butchers; Jewish philanthropists were represented on the board of the first mosque in the area; planning permission secured by Jews established precedents exploited by other minority faiths. In a Catholic church in Forest Gate today, Hindus and Christians share devotion to St Antony. Muslim seamen on Muharram — and Maltese and Italian Catholics on saints’ feast days — have used street processions to claim public space.

Mobile Worlds

Devotional practices, imagery and sensualities have always been both portable and subject to reinvention in new contexts. Some faith practices have been more mobile than others, and some denominational groups have had a closer elective affinity with the diasporic condition. But securing burial space has been one of the first associational activities practised by migrant arrivals, as shown in the Indigent Muslims’ Burial Fund in the 1920s or the burial societies established by fraternities of Jews from common hometowns, signalling a process of settlement and making home. Other forms of home have taken people out of communal space, as in the mixed marriages whose stories punctuate accounts of the East End’s faith communities, or into the public sphere, such as the use of the East End’s parks or even car parks as temporary devotional spaces for migrant communities.

Plotting Politics

Finally, diasporic identities have grounded political mobilisation and emergent forms of citizenship and belonging. Our research found that diasporic politics have been resolutely non-linear. From the point of arrival, there has been engagement with here-and-now questions of the right to live in the city of settlement, but also calls to identity in long-distance solidarity with co-ethnics or co-religionists in multiple points of affinity elsewhere. Allegiances have been layered and multifaceted, sometimes confessional and sometimes not: emergent neighbourhood nationalism, secular homeland nationalisms, hometown translocalisms, universalising class identities, and ecumenical loyalties to global identities such as the Islamic ummah have all come into and out of focus at different moments. Among Christians, Jews and Muslims, socialist and radical politics have sometimes been anti-clerical, staging solidarities across faith lines. At other times, radical politics have been closely articulated with faith, as with nineteenth- or twentieth-century Anglo-Catholic and Catholic slum priests and missions in the Isle of Dogs or with the garment industry strikes of the 1910s led by anarchists but plotted in synagogues. Our research has sought to place these and other diasporic formations back into space and time, both to develop a diasporic critique of conventional histories and cartographies and to offer a historically and geographically richer contribution to migration studies.

Bibliography

IMMIGRATION AND INDIGENISM IN POPULAR HISTORICAL DISCOURSES

Marc Scully

This project has investigated the legacies of the diasporas of the First Millennium CE in present day Britain and Ireland, particularly in relation to contemporary identity. From a social psychological perspective, we have been interested in how individuals construct personalised links to groups known to us as ‘Celts’, ‘Vikings’ and ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and how these are situated within collective identities. We have been particularly interested in the role of collective memory and narrative in constructing these identities, how ‘origin myths’ are told, adapted and performed, and how heritage is commemorated and memorialised. While collective memory of migration and the homeland is one of the characteristics of diaspora (Cohen, 2008), our focus on migration in the early medieval period extends the concept, incorporating archival and cultural memories (Assman, 2011). Fundamentally, we have focused on how narratives of the early medieval period are employed as ‘usable pasts’ in the present, and on what these narratives achieve for people in the present. We have also been interested in the multiple usages of ‘immigration’, ‘indigenism’ and ‘belonging’ as discursive resources within these narratives. Individuals or groups may regard themselves as both ‘immigrant’ and ‘indigenous’ depending on the context.

Methodologically, the project has been based on several case studies, many of which were carried out in collaboration with other members of the Leicester-based Impact of Diasporas project team. Each case study was set in a different location in Britain and Ireland, examining both how identifications with specific groups in the past are constructed, and the various forms of media and evidence drawn upon to support these identifications.

1: APPLIED GENETIC HISTORY AND THE VIKING PAST IN YORKSHIRE

This case study was carried out in collaboration with Turi King’s ‘Surnames and the Y Chromosome’ project looking at the genetic legacy of the Vikings in Northern England. The initial impetus behind this case study was the large numbers of people attending genetic sampling sessions, seeking ‘proof’ of a connection to the Vikings through DNA. In January 2012, we surveyed 128 men attending genetic sampling sessions in York, Harrogate, Lancaster and Keswick. In accordance with the sampling strategy of the ‘Surnames and the Y Chromosome’ project, all the participants were male, had relatively rare surnames, and strong familial links to the local area; the mean age of participants was fifty-nine. Many participants had carried out extensive genealogical research into their own ancestry, and were eager that DNA results should provide the ‘final piece of the puzzle’ in linking them to the Vikings. The results from this survey were published in Sociology (Scull, King, and Brown, 2013).

I then carried out follow-up interviews with eighteen participants from Yorkshire, aiming to explore the impact of the ‘applied genetic histories’ (Sommer, 2012) on the local community and to understand how these ‘applied genetic histories’ were constructed on an individual basis. We found that, in many cases, ‘Viking-ness’ was positioned as a long-cherished family narrative of distinctiveness, and as a means of demonstrating strong ancestral roots, and an affective sense of belonging to a specific locality. At the same time, a number of participants expressed an affinity with Scandinavia, and spoke about their (presumed) Viking ancestry as demonstrating Britain’s status as a ‘nation of migrants’. The perceived status of ‘DNA as proof’ was variable among participants once they had received their results. While some expressed disappointment that genetics could not provide a definitive link with Viking ancestors as they had hoped, for others the results merely had to be convincing enough to weave into a coherent narrative to be passed on to family members, or re-told in social situations.


Working with Morn Capper, this study explored the impact of the recent discovery of the Staffordshire Hoard of Anglo-Saxon gold on local and regional identities in the area. In particular, given the association of the Hoard with the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Mercia, we wished to explore whether ‘Mercia’ might represent a potentially usable past for people in the region, and how this might relate to contemporary identities. There were two major sites for the research, the Potteries Museum and Art Gallery in Stoke-on-Trent, and Tamworth Castle, both of which feature displays of items from the Staffordshire Hoard.

In Stoke-on-Trent, we carried out a focus group in February 2014 with volunteers working at the Hoard display in the museum. At Tamworth, we carried out short interviews with local people on Tamworth Market, and at Tamworth Castle on two separate occasions in August and September 2014. In both venues, the Staffordshire Hoard was viewed as a potential corrective to the current perceived marginalisation of Staffordshire and, more broadly, the Midlands vis-à-vis London in particular. Participants stressed the importance of the objects remaining in Staffordshire, constructing the campaign to ‘save the Hoard’ for the region as important for community cohesion and pride. The two locations differed in the kind of ‘usable past’ the Hoard represented. In Stoke, there appeared to be a concerted effort to link the intricate craftsmanship evident in the Hoard items to the craft history of the area, particularly in relation to pottery. This may be seen as an attempt to ‘indigenise’ the Hoard objects, and stress their ‘authentic’ belonging to the area, through invoking the more recent collective memory of the local ceramics industry. In Tamworth however, the items were more explicitly seen as a direct link to the Anglo-Saxon Mercian past, and particularly to Tamworth’s importance during that time. The presence of Hoard objects in Tamworth Castle adds to its status as a site of memory for Tamworth as ‘capital of Mercia’. Through Mercia, it is possible to read participants’ local identifications as they relate to power, nostalgia and a contemporary sense of disenfranchisement.

3: CORNISH IDENTITY AND A ‘PAN-CELTIC’ PAST

Among other things, a sense of Cornish national identity and distinctiveness from Englishness derives from narratives positioning the Cornish as ‘indigenous’ ‘Celtic’ people, who share a transnational ‘pan-Celtic’ identity with the Irish, Scottish, Manx, Welsh and Bretons (Deacon, 2009). As a means of exploring the dynamics of this identification, and how an imagined shared ‘Celtic’ past is expressed culturally, I conducted a series of short interviews and ethnographic work at the 2013 Lowender Peran festival in Perranporth, Cornwall’s annual festival of ‘pan-Celtic culture’. Issues explored included contestation over what constituted ‘authentic’ Cornish music and culture, the extent and variety of relationships between Cornish participants and those from other ‘Celtic’ nations, and the perceived political marginalisation of Cornwall. In particular, in order to counter the positioning of...
Cornwall as ‘English’, participants engaged in a form of strategic essentialism, based on narratives of the ‘Celtic’ past, but also drew on a form of diasporic consciousness, based on narratives of maritime links and contacts with Wales, Brittany and Ireland, as well as with those of Cornish descent worldwide.

A follow-up study looked at the excavation of St Piran’s Oratory on Perran Sands, through ethnographic research on the annual St Piran’s Day procession to the oratory. St Piran, the patron saint of Cornwall, is reputed to have arrived on Cornish shores having floated on a millstone from the south coast of Ireland. In excavating the oratory, a site of memory has been provided for a Cornish origin narrative that rests on ‘pan-Celtic’ diasporic links, rather than with England, while the memorialisation of St Piran draws on other, more recent markers of Cornish distinctiveness, such as tin-mining and surfing.

4: Lindisfarne Priory as a ‘site of memory’

In collaboration with English Heritage, we carried out research among visitors to Lindisfarne Priory in November 2012, aiming to investigate the importance of the Priory for visitors as a site invested with meanings relating to the early medieval past. The Priory is notable for being a significant religious site of Early Christian heritage in England, an important cultural site associated with Anglo-Saxon Northumbria, as well as the location of the first recorded Viking raids on England in 793 CE.

We carried out short structured interviews with fifty eight visitors in twenty seven family and friendship groups, collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. The Priory was variously constructed as a site of knowledge and of pilgrimage. Some visitors, particularly those with young families, constructed their visit to Lindisfarne as a means of learning about Viking invasions, whereas for others, it was a site of memory associated with early Christian heritage. The Anglo-Saxon past was rarely invoked in people’s narratives of the importance of the Priory, although it was occasionally mentioned in conjunction with the Lindisfarne Gospels as an important aspect of the heritage and identity of Northern England.

5: Commemorating and celebrating the Viking past

Viking festivals are a well-established facet of heritage tourism in Northern Europe (Halewood and Hannam, 2001), with the ‘Destination Viking’ partnership linking cities and other locations with ‘Viking pasts’. In order to explore the extent to which local urban identities are intertwined with celebrations of the Viking past, I led fieldwork at Viking-themed festivals in York, Lerwick (Shetland), Dublin and Waterford. The first two were annual events (the Jorvik Viking Festival in York and Up Helly Aa in Lerwick), while the events in Dublin and Waterford commemorated the Millennium of the Battle of Clontarf and a notional 1200th anniversary of the founding of Waterford by the Vikings, respectively. Analysis suggests that these events played locationally specific roles in each city. York is relatively securely in its status as England’s ‘main Viking city’, and so largely operates as a scenic backdrop for the performances of Viking re-enactors. The Up Helly Aa fire festival in Lerwick is as much about masculinity and family continuity as it is about ‘Vikingness’, but also serves to mark Shetland as distinct from the prevailing winds of Scottish nationalism. The commemorations of the Battle of Clontarf in Dublin sought to challenge prevailing received histories of the battle, and draw parallels between multi-ethnic Dublin in 1014 and the modern multicultural city. Finally, the celebrations of Waterford’s founding as a Viking city are part of a wider effort to draw on the city’s Viking and medieval heritage to spur the regeneration of the city centre.

Preliminary findings

While analysis is ongoing, some overarching themes across the case studies are identifiable.

- Multi-layered memories: Collective memory of the relatively remote past is necessarily encoded in artefacts, whether this be DNA, archaeological finds, or heritage sites. Participants in the various studies employed personal and collective memories based in the more recent past in order to make an early medieval past more accessible.

- Core-periphery identities: Narratives of the past are often constructed to challenge hegemonic identities. While interviewees in Yorkshire were, for the most part, comfortable in identifying as English, they still invoked the Vikings and the period of the Danelaw to articulate a specifically Northern Englishness. Similarly, Anglo-Saxon Mercia was invoked by participants in our Staffordshire Hoard research as a means of recasting the ‘forgotten-ness’ of the Midlands. Cornwall was positioned as an important Celtic nation as opposed to a peripheral English county, while Lindisfarne was seen as a repository of an earlier and more ‘authentic’ Christianity.

- Roots and routes: Participants regularly balanced an often profound sense of belonging and identification with a local area with more outward-looking transnational orientations. For the majority of participants, the notion of ‘homeland’ was relatively uncomplicated, equating to their local area. However, this does not necessarily imply insularity, as migration and mobility in the past were seen as providing international links which resonate in the present.
LINGUISTIC VARIATION IN EARLY ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND

MARTIN FINDELL

‘Pre-Old English’ (pre-OE) has become a conventional label for the Germanic language of the early Anglo-Saxon period (c.400–650/700 CE), a label which is less than satisfactory, not least because it identifies a language only in terms of what came after it. The problematic nature of this label reflects some of the issues in the history of Anglicist scholarship which the Impact of Diasporas project aims to address.

It is not surprising that philologists have treated pre-OE in this way, since it is traditionally defined as the stage of the English language before the production of substantial vernacular texts (see Campbell 1959:31; Hogg 2011:2). The data from this period is sparse; from the fifth and sixth centuries we have perhaps 15–20 runic inscriptions, many of which are partly or entirely illegible. The texts are very short, often consisting of just names or single words, such as the ankle-bone of a deer from a cremation burial at Caistor-by-Norwich, Norfolk, with the inscription raïhan ‘roe-deer’s [bone]’. Over the course of the seventh century, the consolidation of Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and the establishment of an English Church promoted the use of writing (using both runic and Roman alphabets) by elites, and this means that we have more linguistic evidence from the later part of that century in the form of personal names on coins and in one or two early single-sheet charters, as well as runic inscriptions on other types of object.

The dataset is, then, very small, and while it can tell us something about the phonology of pre-OE, it is of little use as evidence for higher levels of linguistic structure. The handbook accounts of pre-OE are likewise concerned with phonology, consisting of a set of ‘prehistoric’ sound changes which differentiate OE from other early Germanic languages (some of which it shares with Old Frisian and/or Old Saxon), and which predate the earliest records of OE ‘proper’. Pre-OE in these accounts is a language reconstructed by methods established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which allowed linguists to ‘undo’ the regular sound changes that differentiated related languages (such as OE and Old High German, for example; or at a deeper chronological level, the Germanic languages and other branches of the Indo-European language family). From this perspective, the task for scholars dealing with pre-OE data ought to be to integrate it into the reconstructed prehistory of OE, as evidence for the sound changes described in the handbooks. This is the task undertaken by Waxenberger (2010), whose meticulous graphemic and phonological analysis of pre-OE
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runes. The study of variation in language — and of sound changes in progress — is the province of sociolinguistics. Sociolinguistic methods have proven value in the study of, for example, late medieval and early modern correspondence (Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg 1996), but pre-OE data is not readily amenable to sociolinguistic study for two reasons. Firstly, sociolinguistic research is empirical and therefore data-dependent. Without a substantial quantity of data, it is difficult to determine either the range of variation in use, or the patterns in that variation. Secondly, sociolinguistics is, by definition, the study of the relationship between linguistic variation and extralinguistic cultural variables such as social status, register (e.g., formal versus informal usage), gender or specific types of social situation. When dealing with historical data, the social context of a text may not be recoverable. For most of the pre-OE texts, we cannot be certain who created them, who the intended audience was or what the texts’ sociocultural function was. A truly sociolinguistic investigation of pre-OE is impossible, but we can at least take inspiration from sociolinguists and pay greater attention to the individual text as a piece of linguistic performance that belongs in a particular sociocultural context. Some understanding of that context can be gained, in some cases, from the work of archaeologists aimed at reconstructing (as far as is possible) past cultures from their material remains.

Another aspect of the linguistic situation in post-Roman Britain, which must be taken into account, is the contact between Germanic-speaking settlers and the local population, who spoke varieties of what Jackson (1953) labelled ‘Late Brittonic’ (LBritt), and/or Latin. The traditional view of Anglicists in the mid-twentieth century was that the language(s) of the Britons had made no significant contribution to the development of OE, on the grounds that OE contains very few Celtic loanwords. Since the 1990s, some Celticians have produced a body of work disputing this view and arguing that various grammatical structures and phonological features of English may have developed in the speech of Britons dominated by, and adopting the culture of, Anglo-Saxon elites. While there is little evidence for or against the ‘Celtic substrate’ hypothesis in the pre-OE dataset, eventual language shift in much of the population of eastern Britain is a given. In the fifth and sixth centuries, we must reckon with a multilingual population, and therefore with the co-existence of Germanic speech varieties with varying degrees of substratal influence. LB Britt speakers acquiring the language of the settlers might be expected to speak it with a ‘British accent’, for example, and to struggle with unfamiliar grammatical structures or idioms, just as second-language learners do today. If these properties were passed on to the next generation, then they would become integrated into the language system of what we might term ‘British Germanic’, and perhaps into some varieties of what later became OE.

It is difficult to make progress on this question using the primary materials. The most recent major contributions in relation to phonology are those of Laker (2010) and Schrijver (2014), who study prehistoric language contacts through the comparison of reconstructed phonological systems. Like other linguists using reconstruction, the focus of these authors’ works is on the longer-term consequences of language contact over a larger geographical area (the Anglo-Saxon territories, and in Schrijver’s case also the areas in which other Germanic languages were spoken in Antiquity and the early Middle Ages).

Taking these approaches together in an attempt to gain a better understanding of language in the early Anglo-Saxon period means shifting our focus from the broader processes of linguistic and cultural evolution and thinking in terms of more localised cultural practices. Each text is an instance of language use by a single person, which may reflect linguistic features of their local community (or part of that community), and/or of wider regional and supra-regional patterns. This more localised focus has parallels with the arguments of archaeologists such as Scull (1995), who posits a smaller scale of social and political organisation in the fifth and sixth centuries than had been previously assumed. The origin of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, in Scull’s view, lies in the late-sixth and seventh centuries with the emergence of elites able to extend and consolidate their power over larger territories. A linguistic correlate of this change in political organisation might, hypothetically, be a tendency towards levelling out local linguistic differences and/or the emergence of regional dialects associated with the new elites as they expanded and projected their power.

The small size of the contemporary dataset presents serious challenges to linguistic analysis, but if we want to arrive at a better understanding of the language spoken by people in this early period, this data must be taken seriously and should be the starting point for analysis. An approach based on micro-readings of individual texts must be inconclusive and limited in scope; at best, the data tells us a small number of individual stories. The application of the comparative method allows us to construct larger-scale narratives, but the mechanical nature of the method and the apparent definitiveness of its conclusions conceal the uncertainties that must be accepted given the paucity of data. Just as the notion of a common ‘Anglo-Saxon’ cultural and ethnic identity in the fifth and sixth centuries is now widely regarded as anachronism, so too should be the notion of a common ‘pre-Old English’ language.

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The project has explored the role of metalwork in forging identity in the Midlands in the seventh century. This was a critical era for kingdom formation, the conversion to Christianity, and the making of English identity. This project brings together objects from across the region to examine how, by around 700 CE, disparate kingdoms had embraced common markers of ‘English’ political and religious identity using strategies which harnessed multiple Germanic, Roman and Biblical pasts, while rejecting their former Insular allies as outsiders and, at times, as heretics.

While coastal rulers in East Anglia and Kent focused on the elite traditions of their North Sea and cross-Channel neighbours, Mercian and Northumbrian elites at first also sought Insular alliances and may also have negotiated leadership through both Anglian and Insular identities. This project considers how seventh-century peoples used past relics and newly forged objects to support ascendant kingdoms and identities, investigating whether stylistic and symbolic themes reflect real contemporary traditions and interactions. By comparing data from site archives, single finds, regional museum collections and the Portable Antiquities Scheme, alongside written evidence, we can explore whether Mercia and its regional neighbours had identifiable metalwork traditions and symbolic languages, and ask if these were deployed in shaping identity.

Data collection has indicated some methodological challenges in building datasets across county boundaries. Analysis of county Sites and Monuments Record (SMR) and Heritage Environment Record (HER) databases has revealed challenges posed by the varied levels of data available on archaeological metalwork across the Midlands. These datasets were not intended for use as research tools and the same software will often have been used differently. County SMR and HER databases can be incompatible and many of the hundreds of sites described by HERs have no verifiable finds data. Where finds are known, these cannot always now be traced: antiquarian discoveries were often re-distributed across a number of museums; the location of objects may now be unknown or they may lie in private hands; the provenance of objects in museum collections may be unknown; the excavations may remain unpublished. Analysing the archaeological record across the Midlands and other larger regions of the UK presents significant challenges.

One case-study provides evidence of the difference between Anglo-Saxon and British metalworking in the ‘long’ seventh century. Textual sources suggest that narratives of political, religious and ethnic division between Anglo-Saxon and British populations were re-enforced as Anglo-Saxon power moved westwards during the making of kingdoms and the process of conversion to Christianity. However, the political history of the Mercian kingdom (as for Northumbria) suggests a counter-current with evidence of alliances with ‘British’ kingdoms and possible political intermarriage. Archaeological evidence and single metalwork finds are beginning to suggest the movement of objects across the Midlands in ways which contradict the simpler textual narratives of opposition between Anglo-Saxon and British peoples, and may be accounted for in the archaeological record by movement of peoples, exile, trade, and even smith’s scrap.

Another case-study explores narratives of Irish diaspora in the conversion of Anglo-Saxon Mercia. Historical narratives indicate that Northumbrian kings used Irish and Irish-trained missionaries in the Midland kingdom, while Bede reports fairly frequent contacts between English and Irish churches in the seventh century. Around 700 CE, such written evidence disappears from our sources. However, the Portable Antiquities Scheme and museum collections contain evidence for a low-level background scatter of Irish metalwork styles in the Midlands dating from the seventh to tenth centuries (Youngs 1989, 1997). This metalwork appears in varied contexts, from single finds to secondary deposition with Viking Age burials, or decorated weights used in the Viking bullion economy. Does such material in the
UK debates over forms of political devolution and popular feelings of regional disenfranchisement.

Throughout this project, I have worked on methodologies which can support sustainable ‘impact’ strategies for research in the heritage sector. Working with museums and arts organisations in the current climate of ‘austerity’ challenges resources. Museums wishing to collaborate with universities often feel constrained in supporting research, whether in working with the public, or providing access to collections. Some institutions are actively considering charging fees for university researchers. These are unfamiliar models in the humanities and social sciences, with potential consequences for research design and objectivity. By designing research tools in consultation with heritage partners, however, we have been able to facilitate knowledge exchange and collect useful data which can support partners in future development with minimal additional resources and without compromising research outputs. Methodologies which further university research aims and academic publications, while creating meaningful impact for partner organisations, are an important outcome of this research project.

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Midlands reflect the simple narratives of religious cultural contact during the conversion period, a longer and broader tradition of Anglo-Irish interaction, or do discoveries more often arise from secondary redistribution by Vikings coming from Ireland during the ninth and tenth centuries as part of the Viking diaspora?

Archaeological discoveries, including early medieval metalwork, can also impact on modern identities. From 2012 to October 2014, I was a curatorial advisor for the permanent Staffordshire Hoard Gallery at Birmingham Museums Trust and acted as a consultant for the Staffordshire Hoard ‘Mercian Trail’ exhibitions. My research here, in partnership with Marc Scully, explores how objects connected with past identities and the historical movement of peoples are associated with perceptions of regional identity and geography in the present day. For the nation as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991), archaeological discoveries — and the museums which display them — can become arenas in which national identities are constructed and negotiated (Maclean 1998). Regionally, however, responses to such discoveries and their inclusion in local narratives may reflect a sense that local agendas and identities have otherwise been overlooked within the nation (Jones 2012).

The ‘Staffordshire Hoard’ of Anglo-Saxon gold, discovered in 2009 by a local metal detectorist in the West Midlands, was a very high profile and unexpected find in the region (Leahy et al. 2011; Webster et al. 2011). Interviews with museum volunteers at the Potteries Museum and Art Gallery, Stoke-on-Trent (joint owners of the Staffordshire Hoard) have explored how the Hoard’s discovery has developed new feelings of connectivity with the deep past and encouraged re-evaluation of the post-industrial identity of the city in favour of a broader chronological sense of the past. Interviews conducted with public visitors to Tamworth, once the ancient ‘capital’ of Anglo-Saxon Mercia, have revealed how the Hoard’s discovery interacts with pre-existing narratives of the town’s historic status and regional identity. The discovery of these ancient objects locally and their display at locations across the region has led the public to interpret the historical relevance of that material via their own understandings of movement across the landscape. This has drawn out important local responses to twentieth century re-development in Tamworth, reflecting modern migration from nearby cities and relations between metropolis and periphery, which have immediate bearing on
In 1016, a Scandinavian king ascended to the throne of the then relatively recently established English kingdom. Canute the Great, or Knút inn ríki as he is known in the Norse tradition, established a short-lived Anglo-Scandinavian Empire, combining his English and Scandinavian conquests with his Danish inheritance. Knut was born in Denmark and remained closely connected with that kingdom, but he spent a large proportion of his time in his ‘new’ home, England. Was he then primarily an English king who just happened to be born Scandinavian? Or was he a Scandinavian king who simply favoured his first foothold on power? This project is concerned with the memorialisation of the identity of the king who was responsible for the political coalescence of parts of the North Sea kingdoms, areas which already showed cultural affinities. The aim of the project is to understand the construction of identity in the memorialisation of Knut, a figure who was closely associated with the Viking diaspora.

BACKGROUND

Over the last decade, the Viking world has been increasingly viewed in scholarship as an early medieval diaspora with a shared origin and culture (e.g. Abrams 2012, Jesch 2015). Spreading out from the Scandinavian homelands of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the peoples who would come to be called the Vikings, established settlements across the North Atlantic in the west and in the Baltic, and along the river systems of Russia in the east. Westward emigration out of the Scandinavian mainland, which is the primary focus of my research, appears to have been a two-stage process. The first wave of migrants spread to Continental Europe and the islands of Britain, Ireland, Scotland, Orkney, Shetland and the Hebrides, stretching as far as the Faroes in the North Atlantic, lands already encountered by Viking raiders and traders. These migrants moved into lands already inhabited by established indigenous populations and were thus subject to processes of assimilation and acculturation, which are reflected in material object finds, place-name evidence, and linguistic exchange.

The second wave migrated further west to Iceland and Greenland, and even briefly settled in North America. By the time of the settlement of Iceland in around the late-ninth and early-tenth century CE, previously established Norse colonies formed a secondary belt of lands of origin for the settlers, the primary zone being Scandinavia. Indications of the connections between the different medieval Norse settlements appear frequently — in the locations of sagas, linguistic borrowings and exchanges, cultural affiliations reflected in archaeological evidence, and even genetic reassortment. In previous research (Vohra, 2017), I have shown that the Norse North Atlantic was a socially functioning diaspora by investigating the Viking world through the lens of kinship relations. The memorialisation of the diaspora in Norse sources clearly reflects sustained links of communication and memory that made it more than just a scattering of Scandinavian settlements across the North Atlantic.

REMEMBERING ENGLAND IN THE VIKING DIASPORA: KNUT IN ENGLAND AND SCANDINAVIA

Pragya Vohra

Although the Viking world shows sociologically recognised characteristics similar to modern diasporas, the position of England in Viking diasporic memorialisation is much less secure than it is for other parts of the Viking world. The impact of Scandinavian settlers in England is visible in archaeological remains, linguistic exchange, and place-name evidence. (The case for mutual intelligibility between speakers of Old English and Old Norse has been discussed by various scholars with the current consensus being in favour of mutual intelligibility.) Yet cultural products and vessels of social memory about England, like sagas and skaldic poetry, are deemed to be ‘lost’, although these are common from other parts of the Viking world. Scholars like Townend (2003) and Fjalland (2005) suggest that these traditions were not preserved because England was not relevant to the later Norse diasporans who memorialised the diaspora.

Memory studies contend that societies make conscious decisions of what is to be remembered and what is to be suppressed, mainly based on the socio-political situation at the time and the prevalent ideology of those in power. Therefore, this project focuses on the point at which England was both socially and politically at the centre of the Viking diaspora—that is, during the reign of the Anglo-Scandinavian monarch, Knut. The hypothesis under scrutiny is whether changes in eleventh-century England to the position and power of Scandinavian and Anglo-Scandinavian elites — who were the primary consumers of Norse cultural products and the vessels of social memory — resulted in the uncoupling of England from Viking diasporic memory. This project therefore focuses on the identities created and negotiated by the king and his elites.

As a Scandinavian monarch, it is remarkable that Knut chose to base himself primarily in England rather than in his Danish homeland, even as he aggressively expanded his power in Scandinavia. He allied himself to the Anglo-Saxon power structure through his marriage to Emma, the widow of his predecessor, Æthelred, and he relied on the support of both Scandinavian and English elites. Knut’s actions over his nineteen-year reign appear to have been a juggling act in managing a dual Anglo-Scandinavian identity.

Knut left England on only four occasions: to claim the Danish throne in 1019 and to deal with particular problems resulting from his expansionist policy in Norway and Sweden (1022–23, 1024–27, 1028–29). On two of these occasions, he sent letters to his subjects in England, in which the absent king fashioned himself not as a Scandinavian conqueror, but as an English king, ruling by English laws and protecting English people (1019–20), and by taking steps for the betterment of his English subjects (1026/27). Similar efforts to fit the traditional mould of an English king are reflected in Knut’s patronage of the English Church, aptly illustrated in one of the few contemporary images of Knut in the Liber Vitae of the New Minster, where he is shown endowing a gold cross set on an altar.

The memorialisation of Knut in Norse sources is different. The thirteenth-century Knytlinga saga describes him as ‘a generous man, a great warrior, valiant, victorious’. The rich corpus of Old Norse skaldic verse associated with the king, including several Knútsdráapur (praise poems for Knut), highlight Knut’s ‘Scandinavian-ness’ through epithets mentioning Denmark or Jutland, references to his ancestry, and associations with the line of Ivarr (the first established Scandinavian lord in England). The Knut of his skalds’ vision — sanctioned by the king himself — is a Scandinavian king above all, and a conqueror.

Attempts to maintain a balance between ‘Englishness’ and ‘Scandinavian-ness’ are evident in Knut’s relationships with his elites. Twenty earls attested charters across the entire period...
of Knut’s reign; twelve have Scandinavian names and eight have English names. Some Scandinavian earls came during the first expeditions into England, and were clearly important figures in Knut’s early reign. However, from the patterns of attestation, it appears that English earls, although outnumbered, were no less important. Godwine, for instance, attested all but one of Knut’s charters and is called dux et baiulus (’duke and steward’) in the Vita Ædwardi. Godwine even made the journey to Denmark with Knut as an English adviser to the King of Denmark. Godwine is an excellent example of the rise of a ‘new aristocracy’, especially towards the latter half of Knut’s reign. The rise of new noble English families represented a remarkable shift in the nature of Knut’s elite following, and these English earls held power when Knut’s descendants came to the throne. The ascendancy of Knut’s English earls may plausibly have had an important effect on the manner in which England was connected to the wider Viking diaspora. The production of cultural material like sagas and skaldic verse relied on the elites for both their patronage and their audiences. The ascendant English earls may not have had any use for Norse memorialisers of a Scandinavian past, especially following the ascension to the throne of Knut’s part-Scandinavian descendants, his sons by Emma. It is possible therefore to suggest that the changing identity politics of the mid- to late-eleventh century contributed to the ‘forgetting’ of the place of England in the Viking diaspora.

MEMORIALISING DIASPORA: SOME CONCLUSIONS

In addition to unpicking Scandinavian and English identities during the reign of Knut, this project also focuses on the process of memorialisation. Diaspora theory recognises that diasporas normally focus on a centre or point of origin. Although Norway was the ‘original homeland’ for the Viking diaspora, this conceptual centre was not involved in the recording of its history. Instead, a single member of the diasporic periphery — Iceland — monopolises memorialisation. Therefore, in looking for the place of England in this memorialisation, the Icelandic relationship with Norway is of interest. Knut defeated Olaf Haraldsson, the sainted King of Norway. The later twelfth- and thirteenth-century memorialisers of the Viking diaspora were writing at a time when King Olaf had been canonised as the patron saint of Norway and his descendants were on the Norwegian throne. As the Danish connection to Iceland had waned and Norway’s ascendancy over Iceland had been established, it is plausible that the socio-political situation at that time also encouraged the suppression of links to Denmark and by extension, to England. Parts of the diaspora like England, thus, were ‘forgotten’, not because they ceased to be relevant but because it was politically prudent to suppress their role in the history of the diaspora. With further research, it is hoped that greater insights into these processes and their impact will emerge.

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DIALECT IN THE VIKING-AGE SCANDINAVIAN DIASPORA: THE EVIDENCE OF MEDIEVAL MINOR PLACE- NAMES

ELEANOR RYE

Place-name evidence is important for our understanding of historical settlement patterns, and place-names associated with Scandinavian settlement in the British Isles are no exception. The majority of scholarship has concentrated on the names of villages and larger settlements. It is well known that there are many such Scandinavian place-names in northern and eastern England, and these have frequently been used to delimit areas of Scandinavian settlement in the Viking age, as for instance, on the much-reproduced map below (Figure 1).

In contrast, this project has focused on ‘minor’ names, that is, the names of smaller places including fields and their subdivisions, street names, and minor landscape features such as trees and hillocks. Minor name evidence has also been used to highlight Scandinavian settlement, especially in areas where Scandinavian major names are few or non-existent. This project has two principal aims. The first is to investigate the extent to which the
vocabulary of medieval minor names from two areas of Scandinavian settlement in northwest England was ‘Scandinavian’. The study-areas are the Domesday Hundred of Wilaveston (the modern-day Wirral peninsula) and the West Ward of Westmorland Barony (henceforth ‘Westmorland’) in present-day Cumbria. The second goal is to assess what studies of medieval minor name evidence can tell us, taking into account both the nature of the evidence and how it relates to other information about Scandinavian influence in the areas investigated.

This study is similar in approach to existing studies that have calculated ratios of vocabulary of Scandinavian and Old English in late medieval minor names, the results of which are shown in Figure 2. The method used was as follows. All minor names recorded before 1500 from the two study areas were excerpted from the Survey of English Place-Names and entered into a database with information about location and date. The words making up the names (place-name ‘elements’) were assigned a source language where the etymology was straightforward. There were, however, a number of elements which would be indistinguishable in their Old English (OE) and Scandinavian (ON) derived forms, predominantly due to the close relationship between the languages (cf. OE land and ON land); these were separately labelled. Those elements with a secure Old English origin and those with a secure Scandinavian origin could then be sorted and counted by date and location.

What can be revealed by this method of quantifying Scandinavian elements in minor names? Scandinavian settlement, either in an English-named village (Hald 1948: 14–194), or at least near an English-named village (Cameron 1973: 42), was inferred from early studies that quantified the Scandinavian contribution to the vocabulary of late medieval minor names. However, in areas of England where Scandinavian settlement is likely to have occurred, minor names are predominantly preserved in records dating from the twelfth century or later. They are therefore at some chronological remove from the principal period of Scandinavian settlement in the late ninth and early tenth centuries. Moreover, minor names are thought to have had a shorter period of currency than major names; they were known to a more limited number of speakers and were less frequently recorded in official records. Consequently, David Parsons, in a quantitative minor name study (2006: 166), was far more circumspect about its relevance for evidence of Scandinavian settlement, arguing that his study was primarily an investigation of Middle English dialect vocabulary.
Investigating other information about Scandinavian influence in the study-areas can shed light on what minor name evidence can tell us. Genetic surveys now have the potential to illuminate one of the many unknowns about Scandinavian settlement in the British Isles, namely levels of Scandinavian ancestry in a given population. The Wirral study-area was selected for study principally because there is an existing genetic survey of the area (Bowden et al. 2008). Although no genetic study exists for Westmorland, the results of a genetic survey from nearby Penrith can usefully be compared (Capelli et al. 2003; cf. Bowden et al. 2008: 305). Major place-name evidence, archaeological and sculptural evidence have also been considered. The minor name evidence was then considered in the light of these other sources.

Both study areas, Wirral and Cumbria, are well-known areas of Scandinavian settlement. Both places preserve pre-Conquest sculpture carved in styles predominantly associated with areas of Scandinavian settlement in Britain, as well as artefacts with Scandinavian-inspired forms or decoration (Grifths et al. 2007: 62–63, 67–71, and 402; Bailey 2010: 29–31 and 38–40; Bailey and Cramp 1988: 130–32; Edwards 1998). Further, there are several major Scandinavian place-names in both areas: for example Whale, ON hváll ‘isolated round hill’, in Westmorland, and Thingwall, ON þing-vo ˛llr, ‘assembly meadow’ (compare Þingvellir, the early site of the Icelandic parliament), in Wirral (Smith 1967 ii pp. 183–84; Dodgson 1972: 273). An early tenth-century settlement of Scandinavians near Chester, recorded in an Irish text known as the Fragmentary Annals of Ireland, may refer to settlement in Wirral, but is clearly embellished (Wainwright 1948). Whatever the veracity of the account, a genetic survey has estimated Norwegian male ancestry amongst the modern-day population of Wirral to be 38 ± 3% and (by the use of surname-based sampling) 47 ± 5% amongst the pre-industrial population (Bowden et al. 2008). Scandinavian male ancestry in the modern population of Penrith, very near Westmorland, has been estimated at 37 ± 3% (Bowden et al. 2008: 305–6).

How does this compare with the minor name evidence? As might be expected, a high proportion of medieval minor name vocabulary from Westmorland is of Scandinavian origin. Scandinavian-derived elements account for nearly half the elements of either Old English or Scandinavian origin. Moreover, Scandinavian-derived vocabulary constitutes a higher proportion of these elements when repeated elements are counted, meaning that individual Scandinavian-derived elements were used more frequently than Old English-derived elements. There are no evident areas of particularly high or low usage of Scandinavian elements. When analysed by ecclesiastical parish (and Clifton, with very few recorded names, is excluded), the ratio of Scandinavian-derived to Old English-derived elements ranges from 47:53 to 66:34. Comparison with the results of similar studies shows the proportion of vocabulary of Scandinavian origin to be comparable with those from areas of Lincolnshire, where...
significant levels of Scandinavian settlement are inferred from major names and other
evidence.

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In contrast, Scandinavian settlement in Wirral did not have such an enduring linguistic impact on the area’s medieval minor name vocabulary. Across Wirral, Scandinavian-derived elements account for less than one-fifth of the different elements distinguishable in Scandinavian and Old English forms. Further, when the proportion of all Scandinavian-derived elements (including repeats) is calculated, the ratio of Scandinavian to Old English elements is even lower, indicating that individual Scandinavian-derived elements were used less frequently than Old English-derived elements. Unlike Westmorland, there are perceptible differences in the level of Scandinavian vocabulary in different areas. Proportions of Scandinavian vocabulary from parishes towards the north-west of Wirral are greater than those to the south-west, but the ratio of Scandinavian- to Old English-derived elements is everywhere lower than 25:75. The proportion of the vocabulary of Scandinavian origin is thus approximately comparable with that from Billingham and Wolviston in County Durham, an area where significant Scandinavian settlement is not usually reckoned with.

This project has demonstrated that the use of vocabulary of Scandinavian origin in the medieval minor names of Wirral was much lower than that in Westmorland, despite significant evidence for Scandinavian settlement in Wirral. The major name evidence, predominantly recorded by the twelfth century, suggest that there had been substantial Scandinavian influence on the naming repertoire in Wirral as well as Westmorland, and genetic surveys suggest comparable levels of Scandinavian male ancestry in both populations. It appears, then, that although the circumstances and linguistic consequences of Scandinavian settlement in both areas might initially have been similar, developments in the following centuries led to very different levels of Scandinavian influence upon place-name vocabulary by the Middle English period.
Indeed, the lower levels of Scandinavian vocabulary calculated for the Wirral corpus, when repeated elements were included, suggest that some of the Scandinavian-derived place-name elements were not frequently used, and it is possible that some Scandinavian-derived elements in Wirral minor names survived in names coined in an earlier period, when the use of Scandinavian-derived place-name elements may have been higher. In contrast, the higher levels of Scandinavian vocabulary usage when repeated place-name elements were counted in the Westmorland corpus suggest that Scandinavian-derived place-name elements remained a significant part of the naming repertoire of local speakers towards the time when the names were recorded. This interpretation of the evidence suggests, then, that the use of Scandinavian-derived vocabulary had remained significant in Westmorland in the centuries following settlement in the region, but had decreased significantly in Wirral. A stronger impetus to Anglicise in Wirral, firmly under English control by the eleventh century, than in following settlement in the region, but had decreased significantly in Wirral. A stronger impetus to Anglicise in Wirral, firmly under English control by the eleventh century, than in

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GENETIC MARKERS AS EVIDENCE OF PAST EXPANSIONS

JON WETTON

Your DNA carries written within it a fragmentary record of past events which can be interpreted by comparison with the DNA of others. Whilst, on average, any two humans share more than 99.9% of their DNA sequence, it is the regions which vary between people that can provide an insight into individual origins and the comings and goings of our ancestors. Like a vast manuscript, which must be transcribed anew every generation, each genome acquires new variants through errors in the copying process, equivalent to spelling changes or the duplication or deletion of a word, and these are propagated to subsequent copies. Common origins are recognisable through the shared possession of such variants, whilst the overall degree of divergence can be used to estimate the number of copying events since the most recent common ancestor, if each type of error occurs at a roughly steady rate.

Just as textual and linguistic similarities provide evidence of the spread of cultures and their local differentiation, the distribution of particular genetic variants can chart the spread of the ancestors of modern populations and their local expansions. While cultural trends can spread rapidly and horizontally within a generation, and persist after the innovators have departed, DNA can only pass vertically down to an individual’s descendants, demonstrating that they remained long enough to leave an impact on the population’s gene pool. Conversely, the discovery of lost variants in DNA recovered from ancient burials may indicate that the source group subsequently moved away, left no descendants, or that, by chance, a variant has been lost in the generations leading to today’s residents.

The variants are encoded by the DNA alphabet, which comprises the nucleotides A (adenine), C (cytosine), G (guanine) and T (thymine); these are the chemical links in the intertwined chains of the DNA double helix. Our full genetic code of some six billion nucleotides is divided among twenty three pairs of chromosomes, one copy of each pair inherited from the mother and the father, with two significant exceptions. The first is the special case of the twenty third pair of which women possess two X copies and men a copy of the X from their mother and the Y from their father. The other twenty two pairs and a woman’s X chromosomes are free to exchange equivalent sections of DNA in a reciprocal manner in each generation allowing mutations, which originally occurred on different copies of the same chromosome, to become physically linked. In contrast, the Y chromosome passes from father to son, and is never paired with another Y with which DNA sequences can be exchanged (Figure 1). This is of particular importance in genetic studies of past populations,
as each Y chromosome accumulates rare changes (mutations) which arose in a single paternal lineage. Thus, if two males share a Y chromosome sequence, then this is direct evidence of common descent. As the length of the Y chromosome exceeds fifty seven million nucleotides, of which more than ten million are present in a single copy, it offers abundant opportunities for the accumulation of novel mutations (Jobling et al. 2014) and the creation of an evolutionary tree based on the sequential divergence of lineages.

Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), whilst present in both sexes, is inherited solely from a mother to her children, and, as with the uniparentally-inherited Y chromosome, it represents a single lineage, in this case passed down the female line. The mitochondrial genome is much smaller than the Y, about 16,568 nucleotides, but has a much higher mutation rate. The most common kind of variation is a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) in which one nucleotide is substituted for another, e.g. A for G, or C for T. These can arise anywhere in the genome at an average rate of approximately 1 in 100,000,000 per nucleotide per generation (excluding mtDNA); consequently, change at a specific site is exceedingly rare. However, due to the vast number of potential sites, it is almost inevitable that new SNPs will arise every generation. Another type of variant occurs in regions known as short tandem repeats (STRs), which consist of a short sequence of typically 2-6 nucleotides repeated several times in a head to tail fashion. Here the difference between individuals results from the gain or loss of repeat units. New variants are produced much more frequently than is the case for SNPs, typically 1 in 1000 per STR per generation. Because STRs change rapidly and SNPs change slowly, we have genetic markers that can be used to differentiate between individuals who have both recent and ancient shared ancestry.

At Leicester, we have been examining the frequency of SNP variants at 565 sites on the Y chromosome and 112 sites on the mtDNA in 1073 males and 1763 females who provided DNA samples for the ‘People of the British Isles’ (PoBI) project (Bodmer 2015). This study aims to determine the impact of past migrations on the genepool of the British Isles by restricting the sample collection to individuals whose grandparents were all born within eighty kilometres of each other, thereby providing a snapshot of the genetic landscape in the
late nineteenth century. Our analysis has shown that genetic diversity in mtDNA is quite evenly spread across the British Isles, whereas there is a significant decline in genetic diversity among Y chromosomes from the east of England to the north and west, which is compatible with the influx of new variants being introduced from the near Continent by migrants from north-western Europe and Scandinavia (see Rasteiro in this volume).

The results are consistent with those obtained by the PoBI team when they analysed more than 500,000 SNP sites on the twenty two pairs of bi-parentally inherited chromosomes using two advanced statistical techniques (fineSTRUCTURE and GLOBETROTTER) (Leslie et al. 2015). These provided evidence of genetically identifiable sub-populations in the PoBI dataset, which mapped roughly within the territories occupied by ancient tribal groups with a particularly large subpopulation encompassing the area from Kent to Yorkshire, Glouctershire and Dorset, which they suggest corresponds to the main area of Anglo-Saxon settlement. When TESS, a technique which clusters populations together based on their genetic similarity, is applied, two populations are detected in our analysis of the Y chromosome data, one of which corresponds closely to the area ascribed to Anglo-Saxon genetic influence. This may hint at a more significant role for male migration in creating this feature of the British genetic landscape, as it is not detectable when the mtDNA is examined. More robust support for such conclusions requires modelling of possible alternative scenarios as described by Rasteiro in this volume.

DNA sequencing performed at Leicester of more than 400 Y chromosomes sampled from European and Asian men revealed 13,261 Y-SNPs, of which two thirds were previously unreported (Hallast et al 2015). We have used these to sub-divide men belonging to a Y chromosome lineage (known as R1a) that has until recently been considered by the genetic genealogy community to be indicative of Norwegian Viking ancestry when present in British males (see Scully, this volume). This association is based on the high frequency (over 20%) of R1a in both modern Norway and also in Orkney, which was part of the Kingdom of Norway from 875 to 1472, compared with a frequency much closer to 2% in neighbouring regions of the Continent. Our STR data suggest that, whilst many men sharing the canonical Norwegian R1a type share a high degree of similarity, they belong to a number of subtly different lineages that have diversified from a recent common ancestor suggesting that one male lineage was particularly successful and has left many descendants. However, our new SNP data show that R1a men in English counties south of the Thames are more likely to have inherited their Y chromosomes from men originating in Eastern Europe rather than Scandinavia. As DNA sequencing technology continues to improve, we will undoubtedly discover more DNA variants that can cast light on the movements and origins of human populations, which will lead to further reassessments.

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DNA AND PAST MIGRATIONS: STORY TELLING OR STORY TESTING?

RITA RASTEIRO

Population genetics is the study of patterns of genetic diversity and how these change over time when subjected to evolutionary forces. Today it stands alongside traditional disciplines such as history, archaeology, and historical linguistics as a method for studying the human past. While historians use historical records, population geneticists use genetic data to reconstruct the demographic history of populations and to identify key features of that same history. For instance, genetic data can be used to detect, quantify and date past changes in population size and also migration events.

At Leicester, the Modelling Migration project has used genetic data, together with computer simulation, to explore the consequences of past migrations and the influence of social structure and different cultural practices on today’s patterns of human genetic diversity in the British Isles. Since prehistory, migration into and out of the British Isles has always influenced the population and, consequently, its genetic makeup. However, the impact of each migration event on the modern British gene pool is still subject to much debate both in academic literature and in popular culture.

As described by Wetton above, we have been examining mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) and Y chromosomes of individuals who provided samples for the ‘People of the British Isles’ project. The spatial patterns of genetic diversity of mtDNA and Y chromosome in Britain (Figure 1) are quite different, which could arise from different demographic histories of females and males. There is a decline among Y chromosome genetic diversity from the east of England to the north and west; this is compatible with both an influx of new Y chromosomes in the east, introduced by migrants from mainland Europe, and with the so-called ‘Celtic fringe’ being genetically more isolated. In contrast, mtDNA genetic diversity is higher and more evenly spread across the British Isles, suggesting that women were more mobile than men, thus diluting the differences between populations. Previous studies have also shown that mtDNA and Y chromosome data can exhibit different patterns (Rasteiro et al. 2012; Wilkins and Marlowe, 2005) which are partly a factor of the random nature of inheritance (genetic drift) and partly due to cultural practices, particularly post-marital residence rules; most societies are patrilocal, where men are more likely to stay close to their birthplaces upon marriage than women, as they tend to control and inherit wealth.

The description of patterns of genetic diversity has been traditionally used to study the migration history of populations. However, it is difficult to infer past demographic events using patterns of genetic diversity, as different evolutionary histories can give rise to very similar patterns. Similarly, even if we could go back in time and use the exact same conditions multiple times, the end result would always be different simply due to the random nature of ‘genetic drift’ and mutation. In addition, past demography and even social structure and cultural practices can also lead to misleading results.

Therefore, we should be cautious in only using descriptive approaches, in order to avoid over-interpretation of the data and ‘storytelling’ narratives. Instead, we should look at these methods as a way of proposing hypotheses that we can test using computer simulation (Figure 2). Together with our knowledge of Population Genetics, we can create a theoretical framework where we build evolutionary models (our scenarios) informed by other disciplines (such as genetics, anthropology, archaeology, linguistics or history) to generate simulated genetic diversity. This way we can control all the stochastic features of evolution, but we can also explicitly model demography. Different scenarios corresponding to different hypotheses are tested and their expected (simulated) genetic diversity is then statistically compared to the observed one. The scenario that best explains the patterns of genetic diversity that we see today is the one that is then accepted. One of main advantages of this type of approach is the potential for improvement, as new features and information can always be added (Pinhasi et al. 2012).

It is important to understand that human populations have very complex histories and that no genetic dataset will have enough information to fully recover it. It is also clearly impossible to model such complexity and thus, one should look for the simplest model that...
captures the relevant features of the known history of the population. As George Box famously put it: ‘all models are wrong, but some are useful’. Indeed, while a model is no more than a mathematical description of reality, successful statistical inference is possible as reality does have a certain degree of consistency that we can exploit.

One element of our project has investigated the genetic contribution of Norwegian Vikings to the British Isles and beyond. Using data from a variety of historical and archaeological sources, together with Y chromosomal and mtDNA data, we used model-based simulation approaches to explore both the genetic consequences of Norwegian migrations in the Viking age and the subsequent impact on patterns of genetic diversity that are identifiable today. In Orkney, we are particularly interested in questions such as: is there a genetic legacy attributable to Viking age migrations?; were these migrations male- or family-based?

To explain Orkney’s genetic diversity, we tested three sets of hypotheses concerning Norwegian migration patterns (Figure 3). All hypotheses assume a simple split in an ancestral European population which differentiated between the population that now inhabits Norway and another that moved into Britain thence Scotland. A second split followed corresponding to the colonisation of Orkney. For each set of hypotheses, we tested two different types of scenarios with and without migration between Scotland and Orkney, from the time of the colonisation of Orkney up to the present. First, the ‘no migration’ hypothesis assumes that there was no migration from Norway and was tested as part of the scientific method, i.e. it is a hypothesis that we know is not true. The second hypothesis, ‘one-wave’ migration, assumes a single migration in 875 CE, corresponding to a large influx of people when Orkney was annexed to Norway. Finally, in our last hypothesis, migration was ‘continuous’ from 875 up to the re-annexation of Orkney to the Scottish crown in 1472 CE.

To compare our observed genetic diversity to the one simulated under each of the six scenarios described above (see also Figure 3), we used an Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) framework. This allows us to statistically select the best scenario(s) and to estimate demographic parameters (e.g. the number of migrants, growth rates and population sizes). Our ABC results support the hypothesis that proposes the migration of both Norwegian men and women to Orkney, suggesting a family-oriented migration for places closer to the Scandinavian homeland (Goodacre et al. 2012). Moreover, there was a continuous influx of men from Norway while Orkney was under Norwegian rule. However, the
situation is not so clear for women and it is difficult to distinguish between the ‘one-wave’ and ‘continuous’ migration hypotheses: Norwegian women migrated to Orkney, although we cannot be sure if they arrived all at the same time, if there was continuous migration of women from Norway during the five centuries of Norwegian rule, or if women moved to Orkney in shorter phases or pulses. In addition, our results also suggest continuous movement of women and men to and from Scotland.

The approaches described here are being applied to other regions in the British Isles to provide further evidence of the genetic impact of past migrations in the making of Britain.

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